

Eu Social Cit

European Social Citizenship

Measuring social citizenship in social policy outputs, resources and outcomes across EU member states from 1985 to the present

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EuSocialCit working paper

September 2021



This working paper is published as part of the EuSocialCit project, which has received funding from the European Commission's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement no 870978.

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To be cited as:

Eick, G.M., Burgoon, B.M. and Busemeyer, M.R. (2021) Measuring social citizenship in social policy outputs, resources and outcomes across EU member states from 1985 to the present, *EuSocialCit Working Paper*, 9 September. <https://10.5281/zenodo.5497185>

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The authors wish to thank Caroline de la Porte and Anton Hemerijck for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this working paper.



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Summary

Social rights are essential for fully realising European Union (EU) citizenship and reaching the EU's targets in reducing poverty and social exclusion. This paper lays the empirical groundwork to investigate the development of European social citizenship from 1985 to the present. It does so by drawing on a newly-compiled database, the Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset (CSCD), that brings together existing country-year macro data on policies, regulations, laws, social, economic and political conditions relevant to social rights. This dataset's key measures concern three categories central to the EUSOCIALCIT's resource-based conception of social rights: (1) policy outputs, including spending and policy-effort measures of policies seeking to foster social rights; (2) outcomes, societal conditions like poverty and inequality relevant to the societal value-added of social rights; and 3) resources on which citizens and policymakers draw that drive and give policy force to social rights. Based on analyses of the CSCD macro-level measures of such conditions, the paper develops two sets of insights into a resource-based conception of social rights in Europe.

First, the paper identifies key trends in social rights outputs. Convergence trends suggest the emergence of a European welfare state model and not a race to the bottom in social rights. These trends were mostly observed for the pre-crisis years prior to 2007/2008. In contrast, divergence in outputs, resources and outcomes increased somewhat again after that, despite intensified EU-level efforts to establish and expand the social pillar of European integration in the 2010s. Apparently, there is (still) some disconnect between the actual policy developments within and across member states on the one hand and the dominant direction of policy initiatives at the EU level on the other – an issue that later deliverables of this work package will explore. Whether there is recalibration, i.e. redistribution of resources from one social policy area to another, is difficult to say. However, our analysis confirms a noticeable trend from social transfers towards social investments.

Second, the paper also explores basic macro-level connections between social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes crucial to a resource-based conception of social citizenship. Focusing on links between outputs and outcomes, bivariate macro-level associations suggest that social policy spending measures – both aggregate measures of social policy effort and also more broken-down measures focused on education, employment and family policies – may considerably improve inequality outcomes over time, including reducing poverty risk and mitigating income and gender inequalities. Focusing on links between resources and outputs, macro-level associations suggest a wide array of how such resources matter, including examples of instrumental, normative and enforcement resources as distinguished in our research. And focusing on how resources might moderate the links between outputs and outcomes, we also see how key welfare-spending measures that are social-rights outputs can have quite disparate implications for outcomes like poverty and inequality, depending on these same measures of resources. Overall, the patterns presented here suggest how the CSCD is a useful data source for exploring social citizenship on the macro-level, and clarify the empirical manifestations of a resource-based conception of social citizenship.

Measuring social citizenship in social policy outputs, resources and outcomes across EU member states from 1985 to the present

Project name	The Future of European Social Citizenship
Project acronym	EuSocialCit
Grant Agreement ID	870978
Deliverable number	D6.1
Lead partner	University of Amsterdam
Work package	<p>EuSocialCit is an interdisciplinary research project aiming to support the EU in strengthening social rights and European social citizenship. It evaluates the current state of social rights in Europe and their relationship to social inequalities, gender inequalities, poverty and precariousness, and diagnoses the shortcomings of current policies and institutions at the level of individual countries and the EU.</p> <p>The EuSocialCit project focusses on three domains in which social rights are important: the empowerment of citizens (e.g. education and activation), fair working conditions and social inclusion. Each of these domains are respectively studied as part of WP3, WP4 and WP5.</p> <p>This report is produced as part of WP6 which is entitled “<i>listening to the citizens: public opinion on European social citizenship</i>”. This WP combines an in-depth examination of the subjective dimension of social rights with an EU-wide quantitative analysis of policy outputs and outcomes, linked to the domains of social rights as analysed in WP2-5.</p> <p>As a whole, WP3-6 feed into WP2 “<i>Social citizenship in Europe and the role of the EU: conceptual framework, state of play and scenarios for improvement</i>”. This WP develops a novel, resource-based and multi-level conception of social rights. Based on the empirical findings from WP3-6, it will produce two flagship reports: one on the state of social rights, and another on the future of social rights.</p>
Web address	For more information about the EuSocialCit project, please visit www.eusocialcit.eu . EuSocialCit’s output can also be found in its community on Zenodo: https://zenodo.org/communities/eusocialcit .

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1. Introduction

The new millennium has brought sweeping transformations to European societies: the deepening of globalization and greater European Union (EU) integration, the rise of the service and knowledge-based economy, the fourth technological revolution, growing migration flows and rapid socio-demographic changes, including the gender revolution (Wren, 2012; Hemerijck, 2013; Bourguignon, 2015; Mahutga, 2017; Diamond, 2019). Boosting social rights can help address divergence in social trends across and within EU Member States and reduce the risk of socio-economic shocks. Concurrently, social rights are essential to realizing European social citizenship and reaching the EU's targets to reduce poverty and social exclusion. Against this backdrop of 'slow-moving' trends, the post-2008 crisis and the ensuing Great Recession brought additional problems and challenges: declining incomes, rising inequality and poverty, increasingly precarious work, reduced capacity of welfare systems to secure economic and social stability, and divergence rather than convergence in prosperity across the Eurozone (Eurofound, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). The Covid-19 pandemic adds another layer of challenges, significantly increasing European welfare states' stress levels. These developments are generating widespread social problems and political anxieties, including chauvinism as well as radicalization and scepticism towards the EU (Manow et al., 2018; Eick and Larsen, 2021; Armingeon et al., 2021).

Against this background, this study aims to lay the common empirical groundwork to investigate European social citizenship's current and future development. We say 'common' here, in reference to the collective research effort of the Future of European Social Citizenship (EUSOCIALCIT) consortium focusing on such issues, but also in reference to all other scholars and policymakers interested in understanding European social citizenship. For this study, 'laying the groundwork' means presenting and contextualizing a macro-level dataset that the project has assembled: the Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset (CSCD), which focuses on key features of social citizenship. Critical to both the dataset and the broader EUSOCIALCIT project is the focus on social rights as a complex of interconnected policy *outputs* (e.g. policy spending and regulation), actual socio-economic *outcomes* (e.g. poverty or inequality), and power *resources* relevant to social rights (e.g. enforcement capacities, norms or laws encoding rights sought). The resource-based conception is that European individuals and polities use resources to leverage deeper social citizenship in policy outputs and outcomes (Vandenbroucke et al., 2021). To provide empirical clarification of such a resource-based conception of social rights, the present paper draws on the CSCD to identify key macro-level (i.e. country-year level) trends in and associations between social rights outputs, outcomes and resources. This involves finding at least preliminary answers to several empirical questions about social-rights outputs, outcomes and resources in EU member states from 1985 to the present.

Our aim is to bringing the political institutional dimensions back to the heart of the analysis of social citizenship, instead of focussing on micro-level inferences. Furthermore, our analyses depart from the conventional comparative welfare regimes, varieties of capitalism and growth model literatures, by theoretically anchoring our findings on EUSOCIALCIT's conception of resource-based citizenship rights

covering both domestic and EU-governance policy arenas. Consequently, our research design has a strong focus on presenting measurable indicators of this conception. Key among these questions are:

- How should we empirically measure "social citizenship," including its outputs, outcomes and resources? Furthermore, how can we do so with macro-level, i.e. country-year, data, and with widely-available data provided by agencies such as the OECD, Eurostat and others?
- Based on available macro-level indicators, what are the broad development trends – increases, decreases, volatility in spending indicators of policy outputs promoting European social citizenship?
- To what extent do these trends change during and since the crisis years (2007-2008) that have so fundamentally shaken the political and social thinking and policy development surrounding social rights?
- What evidence is there for or against the achievement of convergence to levels of policy outputs within the EU and relative to non-EU states? Is there a basis for describing an existing or emerging European model of the welfare state, or do we instead see evidence for a "race to the bottom" in social rights and/or continued divergence in policy trajectories?
- In order to shed light on how social-rights outputs might affect actual outcomes, what relationships can be found between social-rights outputs/spending on the one hand and socio-economic outcomes of socio-economic wellbeing and suffering?
- Relatedly, to shed light on how resources might influence social-rights outputs, what relationship can be found between social-rights outputs/spending on the one hand and power resources on the other?
- Finally, to shed light on how resources might also moderate the effects of social-rights outputs, how do the relationships between social-rights outputs and outcomes differ across different levels of power resources?

We answer these questions in the following six sections. In Section 2, following this introduction, we set up the knowledge background for our empirical work: The Section discusses the development trajectory of EU social policy since the mid-1980s and summarizes discussions around social citizenship measurement, defining relevant terms for this study. Key to such background is that we clarify the conceptual basics of our resource-based framework for understanding and improving European social citizenship. Section 3 briefly introduces the country-year macro-level empirical dataset – CSCD – that informs our EUSOCIALCIT collaboration, including this paper's empirical work. The paper's remaining sections then draw on this CSCD to illustrate key trends and associations between social-rights outputs, outcomes, and resources in Europe and the rest of the OECD since 1985. Section 4 presents the overall portrait of policy outputs relevant to social citizenship, focusing on trends in spending in general and across social-policy categories, the extent of potential convergence and the general

orientation of welfare states concerning services and social investment versus cash transfers and protection. Section 5 continues the aggregated portrait of social-rights conditions and focuses on how the social policy spending 'outputs' are associated with causally downstream 'outcomes' and upstream 'resources'. Our last and section (Section 6) zooms in on the trends and links between outcomes, outputs and resources with respect to three key faces of social citizenship – education, employment, and family policy outputs. Together, the exploration into such issue-specific detail clarifies how major social right policy outputs are developing in Europe, shaping important socio-economic outcomes and likely related to key power resources consistent with the EUSOCIALCIT framework. Section 7 concludes with a brief recap and mediation on the future of the empirical study of social citizenship.

2. The evolution of European social citizenship since the mid-1980s

2.1 Historical background: The development of European social citizenship

Promoting the social dimension within individual EU countries as well as workers' mobility and equality across the EU has been an established goal of the European integration process already since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. According to the founders of the EU integration project, economic integration would promote progress in welfare-state protections across the Member States. The trajectory of European economic and social policy since then has demonstrated that the convergence of social policy does not happen automatically but requires decisive political action. For this reason, even if only modestly, labour rights were integrated as part of the EU integration project (Ferrera, 2005). Our current era is witnessing the emergence of what can be considered a new Social Question in Europe, reproducing under new guises the double challenge of economic disruption and social/institutional reconstruction within individual EU countries and across the EU.

While the objective of creating a genuinely 'European' dimension to social policy had not been high on the agenda before the 1990s, the creation of the Single Market with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 set in motion lively debates about convergence and divergence of welfare states within the EU. In this period, a more active convergence strategy was adopted by both the European Council and the European Commission: For the first time, they declared the objective of a convergence of social policies of member states and the development of collective objectives of social policies. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty created a distinctive EU citizenship, supervening national citizenship. As was the case in the past within individual countries, the Europeanisation of national markets has been an enormous trigger for job creation and economic growth, particularly through freedom of movement and competition rules. Nevertheless – especially following the global economic and financial crisis – it has also become a source of social disruption. The EU has gradually tried to respond, relying on and expanding its 'social dimension', culminating in the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights in November 2017.

In 1992 also the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was launched, and quite remotely from EU social citizenship, the EMU also prompted deep welfare restructuring. The traditional ("functionalist") perspective on the implications of the EU social citizenship developments for social policy was that the EMU leads to spill-overs from the wished-for neoliberal convergence (Hay, 2004). Critics of the functionalist logic of thinking, however, soon pointed out that the economic logic of the European integration process via the Single Market might create obstacles and barriers for the creation of a genuinely European approach to social policy while undermining existing welfare state institutions at the member state level at the same time.

From this perspective, creating a European Single Market has similar effects as economic internationalization and globalization. As production factors, particularly capital, become mobile

within the European Union, economic integration might put pressure on generous welfare states to cut back social spending and reduce labour 'costs', i.e. wages (Sinn, 2002). Consequently, intensified economic competition within the EU leads to lower social policies standards, the so-called 'social race to the bottom' (Scharpf, 1999). Because of the EMU criteria, this effect could even be more pronounced than the effects of economic globalization beyond the EU borders. The institutional logic of the Single Market propels EU Member States to focus on supply-side strategies when improving their competitiveness (Scharpf, 2002: 649) and to pursue fiscal policy within the constraints of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact. Most famously, Scharpf (2010) also pointed out the "asymmetry" in the European integration process between 'negative' and 'positive' integration, where negative integration refers to market-creating policies that are, according to Scharpf, easier to pass in the veto-ridden institutional environment of the EU compared to positive integration measures that aim at regulating markets. Consequently, critics of the European economic integration process feared that social and welfare-state standards might converge to lower levels.

Partly responding to and thereby also recognizing the validity of this criticism, the EU has considerably strengthened its social dimension since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Importantly, in March 2000, a new strategic aim for the next decade for the EU was set through the Lisbon European Council (European Council, 2000). Here, the European Council adopted the aim that not only economic growth should be strengthened in the EU but also social cohesion. The modernisation of the European social model was a vital part of this objective: 'Investing in people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state will be crucial both to Europe's place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty' (European Council, 2000).

As can be seen from the rhetoric, the Lisbon agenda already highlighted the importance of social investment. When the Council pointed towards eradicating poverty as a strategic social policy aim within the Union, aspirations were high. Thus, the Lisbon Summit promoted social citizenship as a noticeable target for European cooperation. In line with its target to strengthen the social investment dimension of social citizenship, the Lisbon process explicitly coupled the economic and social policy agendas of the integration process. Thus, rather than conceiving the welfare state as being constructed as a force "against markets" (Esping-Andersen, 1985), the EU approach to social policy recognized that welfare state institutions and social policies play an important role in stimulating economic growth, progress and innovation.

Additionally, the Lisbon process laid the methodological bedrock for a new EU-wide approach to social policymaking, called 'open coordination' (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011). The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was introduced to disseminate best practices and accomplish greater convergence towards the main objectives of the EU. Unlike the more hierarchical approach of the Commission of the 1990s, however, the open method of coordination decidedly promoted 'soft' modes of governance by emphasizing cross-national policy learning and communication that remains – formally speaking – voluntary (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012). To achieve convergence via soft modes of governance, a set of social indicators were developed to monitor the developments related to the overarching aim of promoting social cohesion. Combating poverty became one of the fundamental

ambitions in this process. It translated into a number of jointly defined objectives for social inclusion, accompanied by concrete measurements, which were specified through a range of social indicators (Atkinson et al., 2002). Nonetheless, thus far, the OMC has not led to a series number of new social directives and policy initiatives, also because the EU became more diverse in terms of social models (Graziano and Hartlapp, 2019).

Looking back, the implementation of the Lisbon agenda produced mixed results, also because the global economic and financial crisis, which started in 2007 and transformed into a more European crisis of the monetary union after 2010, put severe strains on the European welfare states and the whole process of European integration. More specifically, the limited scope of social citizenship rights at the European level and the specific gaps in the common response to the economic crises (in particular the continuing asymmetry between a Europeanized monetary policy and national fiscal policies) led to mounting criticism and further demands for a strengthening of the European dimension in social policymaking but also resistance against a growing importance of the social dimension at the EU level. Overall, European welfare states had and have been struggling to deal with both long-term transformations as well as the short-term impact of economic crises.

At the EU level, the response of policymakers was to continue to expand the social dimension of the European integration process while also focusing on social investment. In the European Semester process, social issues became more important over time (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018), while roadmaps on the future of the economic and monetary Union emphasised the need for a social dimension to fully realise the EMU (European Commission, 2017). In 2013, the European Commission's Social Investment Package emphasised the need to widen the agenda (on this agenda, e.g., Hemerijck et al., 2016; Hemerijck, 2017). The 2017 proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was an important step forward and a part of the broader evolution in EU policymaking. Thus conceived, the EPSR signalled a gradual paradigm shift away from the singular focus on economic and fiscal performance (Vanhercke et al., 2018). The EPSR underlines the EU's ambition and its member states to develop a meaningful EU social dimension and can potentially play a key role in counteracting today's market disruptions by providing effective, rights-based social support to the EU citizens. To sum up, even if there are more social policy recommendations at the EU level, these are often based on soft law, and therefore lack teeth (Jordan et al., 2021).

2.2 Defining key terms and concepts in the debate on the European dimension of social citizenship

The past five years have seen the European Commission steering away from the singular priority on fiscal consolidation and economic competitiveness dominant in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis to reaffirm its historical commitment to a 'Social Europe' and to a better balance between economic objectives and social concerns. The EU seeks to play a key role here, seeking to strengthen social rights across Europe, most notably through the EPSR. To be successful, the EU's social agenda requires a powerful and legitimate justification – tied in a clear, consistent and convincing way to broadly accepted aspirations for European integration. As long as the concepts of 'Social Europe' and 'Social citizenship' remain vague and ill-defined, the agenda itself will remain ambiguous. For example, some

citizens interpret 'Social Europe' to mean 'protecting domestic social policies against EU interference'. For others, it means 'more supranational EU regulations and initiatives'. This ambiguity offers people the opportunity to subscribe to these goals and push them forward.

Vandenbroucke (2017) and Ferrera (2018) have tried to overcome such ambiguity by proposing the idea of 'a European Social Union'; in a similar vein, Hemerijck (2016) argues that the EU should become a 'holding environment' for national welfare states. These expressions underscore that the European Union itself should not become a welfare state but should rather support and facilitate the development of flourishing national welfare states. However, this immediately begs the question: why should the EU provide its citizens with EU-led social rights if the EU does not aim to become a welfare state itself? The question concerns not only the point and purpose of social rights, but also their legitimacy: to what extent would EU citizens support the development of social rights in a 'union' of welfare states rather than at the level of national welfare states, and what rights should these be? Would the kind of social rights that citizens demand and expect from the EU be different in nature from their expectations regarding national welfare states?

According to Vandenbroucke et al. (2021), there are four different perspectives on how to address and reply to these questions. A first perspective would approach the necessity of a fully-fledged European welfare state model in a more sceptical and critical manner. It would prioritize national welfare states and to maintain and restore their political and fiscal autonomy. This argument is often used in debates around imbalances between the economic and the social policy dimensions of the European integration process. In this understanding, the key challenge is to mitigate the constitutional imbalance (Garben, 2018) or the structural asymmetry (Scharpf, 2010) between what is the market and what is the social in the legal order of the EU. Here the argument is that the very nature of EU legislation largely favours the market. A comprehensive set of social rights can, to some extent, mitigate this structural asymmetry, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the integration project. This would require changes to the current European welfare state model to safeguard the effective functioning of national welfare states (Kilpatrick, 2018; Scharpf, 2016).

In contrast, the second perspective fully supports developing a fully-fledged European welfare state model. However, it still approaches social policy mostly from an economic perspective. For example, recent analyses published by the European Commission argue that enhancing a social dimension is functionally relevant to the completion of EMU and the Single Market (European Commission, 2017). Hence, the goal here is not to weaken the European economic governance model to allow for more autonomy of the national welfare state but instead to complement the existing governance regime with a genuine social pillar. In this line of argument, the completion of EMU requires a degree of convergence in Eurozone member states' social model, which could be formulated in terms of social standards and, thus, social rights. Overall, from this perspective, a comprehensive set of EU social rights could be necessary to support upward convergence among a heterogeneous set of welfare states at different development levels. This argument supports the traditional ambition of European integration – upward convergence in prosperity – but signals that it now requires a social policy framework that is not seen to be at odds with the logic of the Single Market and free movement.

The third perspective approaches a European welfare state model from a non-economic perspective. It is in line with Ferrera (2018: 1), who argues that there is a free-standing political justification to provide EU citizens with EU social rights: 'A tenet of political theory in all its variants is that a territorially organized collectively cannot survive and prosper without the diffuse support of its members. Diffuse support rests, however, not only on effectiveness but also on fairness. Citizens must feel that the territorial government abides by the general norm of somehow representing the collective interest, taking care of all sectors/strata of the population, however weak and peripheral.' This perspective can also be seen as issue regarding the lack of visibility of the EU's social dimension. New elements have been added to the EU's social dimension over the past decades. Still, these elements did not concern the traditional workers' rights area of the Directorate-General of Employment and Social Affairs but, less visible elements, such as Justice and Fundamental Rights in EU migration and asylum law or the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU (Kilpatrick, 2018). This means that this expansion of the EU's social dimension is harder to notice for some citizens than for others. Thus, a comprehensive Social Pillar may be a better way to package and present these rights to all EU citizens and consequently strengthen their connection to the EU's social dimension.

The fourth perspective that Vandenbroucke et al. (2021) offer, approaches a European welfare state model from a non-economic perspective and from a more normative point of view. The authors describe the criticism that the EU does not deliver what it promises regarding the development of social rights at the EU level. This means there is a normative demand for supranational policies to protect the redistributive capacity of individual EU countries to reduce inequalities within and between countries (Vandenbroucke, 2017). From this perspective, EU social rights have the power to achieve social justice in ways individual EU countries cannot, particularly amidst increasing globalisation.

The four perspectives differ concerning their traditions and how much importance they give to social rights, but they are not mutually exclusive. It can be argued that they all make a case for EU social rights based on different traditions which aim for social cohesion through upward convergence. Hence, the EUSOCIALCIT project broadly subscribes to a synthesis of these approaches. While respecting the institutional particularities of different welfare state models across the EU member states, we posit that it is not only possible but also necessary to develop a European dimension of social rights. Moreover, we further believe that the development of such a European dimension can not only rest on economic-functionalist reasoning but requires political justification and legitimation. Of course, ex ante, it is an open question whether citizens across Europe are themselves willing to support the development of social rights at the European level (and this is a question we take up in later stages of the EUSOCIALCIT project). For now, and based on previous research (Kuhn et al., 2020), we posit that this is indeed the case and that the development of a European Pillar of Social Rights would contribute to boosting the support for the European integration project across member states precisely because it contributes to the rebalancing of priorities between economic and social goals.

2.3 A resource-based conceptualization of social citizenship

Like the broader EUSOCIALCIT collective project of which this paper is a part, our conceptual position in the aforementioned debates on social citizenship is to develop what members of our research consortium have elsewhere referred to as a 'resource-based and multi-level conception of social rights.' (Vandenbroucke et al., 2021) This conception is central to our ongoing articulation and empirical analysis of how to promote social rights in the EU, including through the development of EU-level competencies and policy-regulatory arrangements. Before turning to our presentation of data relevant to such articulation and analysis, we should clarify the basics of the resource-based conception.

Following Vandenbroucke et al. (2021), we define social rights as 'a guaranteed subjective power to obtain a certain benefit or service'. Social rights, thus conceived, are constituted particularly by what we call "resources" but also should be gauged concerning social-rights-related "outputs" and "outcomes." Indeed, our project suspects and hypothesizes that guaranteed subjective power resides in the interlinkages between social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes. These three key ordering concepts are schematised in Table 1 below in what is a slight revision of the Vandenbroucke et al. (2021) summary.

Table 1. Social rights, individual power resources and outputs

SOCIAL RIGHTS RESOURCES	INDIVIDUAL POWER RESOURCES RELATED TO SOCIAL RIGHTS		
	<i>Normative</i>	<i>Instrumental</i>	<i>Enforcement</i>
Guaranteed subjective powers to obtain a certain benefit/service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide justifications - Specify the content (who, what, how) - Guarantee compliance from others and <i>establish</i> obligations on public authorities to provide the benefit/services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secure access to the content/output - Provide informal remedial channels for disputes - Guarantee access to justice in case of non-compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guarantee formal adjudication and enforcement
OUTPUTS	MEANS/RESOURCES NEEDED TO TRANSFORM CONTENT INTO OUTPUT		
	<i>Financial</i>	<i>Physical</i>	<i>Administrative/ Organizational</i>
Tangible goods assembled into benefits and services ready for delivery to individuals	Fund allocations	Staff and infrastructures	Roles and offices, implementation and delivery rules, standard operating procedures, etc.

Source: Vandenbroucke et al. 2021, authors' elaboration

Resources are features of individuals, groups, governments or broader polities that undergird the power of individuals to claim and act upon social rights. While resources should be seen from the perspective of (more or less) empowered individuals, the basis of such empowerment can reside in properties of not only individuals but also groupings (e.g. union organizations, political parties) and government institutions (e.g. policies promising potential access to social rights benefits). Resources can be conceptually and empirically distinguished as either *normative*, *instrumental* or *enforcement* resources. *Normative resources* can be manifested in formal legal edicts or goals set-out in policies, regulations or constitutions, but also in the widely-shared attitudes in a polity (e.g. a region, a party, and particularly a nation-state). *Instrumental resources* are more group or individual-based and include conditions that facilitate the access by a potential benefit-recipient or demandeur of social rights to actually gain protections (e.g. information-resources or offices or liaisons in the state or by a social actor like a works council or union). Finally, *enforcement resources* are conditions that actually monitor, sanction or offer footholds to enact normatively-endorsed standards.

Outputs are enacted policies (e.g. spending on various kinds of actual assistance provisions) and material goods (e.g. housing, hospitals, job-training centres, schools, daycare facilities on which spending is focused) that provide and constitute social rights. Such outputs are commonly studied in explorations of social welfare policy and social rights, and they are central to our own conception as well. The main distinguishing feature of our conception of outputs is that we suspect (and empirically hypothesize) that such policies and regulations are expressions – hence "outputs" – of an empowerment process of conferring social rights. They are causally in between resources and outcomes.

Outcomes are socio-economic characteristics of individuals, groups or entire polities that manifest the benefits or fruits of social rights provision – or the lack thereof. They are often conditions that can be paired with particular social rights – for instance, the conditions under which a (formally) guaranteed subjective power to gain a service or benefit is (actually) associated with that particular benefit: e.g. housing conditions of people related to housing rights; healthcare outcomes being outcomes of healthcare as a right. More broadly, however, they can be more general conditions of objective and subjective wellbeing, such as material or subjective income, work, health, fulfilment or happiness.

In our resource-based approach, our empirical expectation is that these "resources," "outputs," and "outcomes" are causally intertwined in the provision of social rights (again, the guaranteed subjective power to obtain a certain benefit or service). Resources and outputs enable the rights-holder to assert their right concretely. Resources have specific contents, which are usually, but not always, defined by the law and are content-specific. They are also distinct from what we call "outputs" and "outcomes." In any event, resources can shape the political influence and traction to alter legislative, legal or regulatory provisions of government that promote a given social-welfare benefit or service. Resources can also be crucial in shaping whether a given output – say, a particular policy provision or spending item in the budget conferring some social-welfare benefit – actually yields meaningful benefits. Furthermore, this means that in many cases, without sufficient normative, instrumental or

enforcement resources, outputs cannot be legitimately and validly claimed and accessed (Vandenbroucke et al., 2021). And, perhaps more obviously, without particular resources and policy-regulatory outputs in a given polity, one can hardly expect meaningful outcomes of importance to social rights. Put differently, the quality of outputs relevant to social rights can be expected to affect various socio-economic outcomes of interest. Such a conception of matters may allow all kinds of causal relationships and feedback loops. Nevertheless, the principal expectation is the set of relationships graphically summarized in Figure 1 below.

To sum up, in simple terms, our conception of social citizenship rights highlights the fact that the availability of particular resources (individual or group-based) influences policy output and also how this policy output is then translated into and connected to actual outcomes. Therefore, the expression of social rights not only depends on legally defined rights but also on complementary instrumental and normative resources, which are required to turn the legal rights into actual outcomes.




Figure 1. Model for relationships on social rights provisions

3. Introducing the Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset

The previous section described the conceptual approach of EUSOCIALCIT to social citizenship. This section and the remainder of the deliverable translates the concept into concrete measures. Measuring social citizenship in terms of outputs, outcomes, and resources is a complex affair. It requires systematic measurement and analysis of laws, spending programmes, regulatory provisions, and public attitudes – preferably all at different levels of aggregation (individuals, groups, regions, nation-states, the European Union, all of European socio-political space, etc.). The EUSOCIALCIT project works with a range of such datasets to meet such needs, from public-opinion datasets to individual-level panel datasets, party-political datasets focused on political positioning, and more aggregated datasets on social policy demography, legal conditions and wellbeing.

The Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset (CSCD) is a major part of that work, focusing on the more aggregated level and bringing together macro-level (i.e. at country-year level of aggregation) measures of social-rights resources, outputs, and outcomes as well as other background characteristics. The dataset combines hundreds of variables from a wide array of commonly available datasets, including both well-known and also lesser-known datasets relevant to the measurement and analysis of various aspects of social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes. Over the past decades, comparative welfare state researchers have compiled a vast amount of data on cross-national differences and changes in welfare state policies. The purpose of the CSCD is not to provide yet another dataset on welfare states policies and institutions. Instead, it combines existing data in new ways to leverage it more effectively for the EUSOCIALCIT project.

In terms of country coverage, the CSCD covers – as much as possible – all EU member states and also includes data on further OECD countries, if available, in order to allow for comparisons between EU members and non-members. For policy and data availability reasons, the time period covered stretches from 1985 to the present. The Appendix (Table A1) presents an overview of the countries included in the CSCD and when they joined the EU/OECD.

Table 2 presents an overview of the various variables that are used to construct the CSCD. However, given the wealth of data, it only includes examples of variables included in the different categories. As a broad overview, the CSCD covers variables categorized to include resources, outputs and outcomes. All three realms get substantial coverage to allow judgment of the character, origins, and consequences of social citizenship in Europe:

Table 2. Example variables from the Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset

	Examples
Outputs	
	Total social expenditure, % of GDP (public/mandatory private)
	Total private social expenditure as % of GDP

	Health, social expenditure as % of GDP
	Old age, social expenditure as % of GDP
	Unemployment compensation/severance pay, public social expenditure as % of GDP
	Direct job creation, public social expenditure as % of GDP
	Housing allowance, public social expenditure as % of GDP
	Start-up incentives, public social expenditure as % of GDP
	Disability pensions, public social expenditure as % of GDP
	Parental leave benefit periodic (means-tested or non-means tested), public social expenditure as % of GDP
	All of the above expenditures levels, but measured per head of the target population or as % government spending; Take-up in all of the above programmes, but measured as actual participation in a programme relative to target population.
Outcomes	
	Gender Inequality Index
	Unemployment, % of total labour force
	Employment to population ratio, 15 years and above
	Educational Attainment, 26-64 years, Level 0-2, % of population
	Entry rates at tertiary level
	Gini index of inequality in equivalized household disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income
	Gini index of inequality in equivalized household market (pre-tax, pre-transfer) income
	At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), total
	At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), males
	At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), females
Resources	
Normative resources	Policies/laws/regulations setting-out benefit levels and access (e.g. replacement rates, eligibility criteria, benefit duration of programmes); Share of population supporting or believing that everyone in the country should have fair chance to achieve the level of education they seek
	The government should reduce differences in income levels
	Attitudes towards standard of living for the unemployed (sick, old, etc.), governments' responsibility
	Strictness of employment protection, individual dismissals (regular or temporary contracts);

	Regulations on workplace safety/standards.
Enforcement resources	Inspectors per 10'000 employed persons
	Labour inspection visits per inspector (capacity to enforce labour standards)
	Labour inspection visits per inspector and labour inspection visits to workplaces during the year (as measures of capacity to enforce labour laws)
	Judicial integrity or non-corruption to interpret and implement laws based on legal merit
Instrumental resources	Strength of collective-bargaining organizations in setting and implementing benefits
	Level of informational transparency in democratic institutions;
	Representation levels of particular group categories (e.g. women) in parliaments or government institutions;
	Legal right to strike

The first category of our social-rights measurement involves diverse measures of social-rights outputs. Most obviously, these include measures of spending or actual participation in policy interventions or regulations that promote the provision of social citizenship. Such policy interventions involve conceptually and in the CSCD measurements a great many ways of construing "output," including various spending-based measures of benefits. Outputs can also involve the physical manifestations of such policy spending, such as buildings, organizations, expert networks, and institutions that provide policy missions. In our focus on policy outputs, CSCD has many measures based on expenditure data on a broad range of policy areas, including old-age pensions, social transfers, health care, family policy, labour market policies, housing, education and other social transfers.

Secondly, the CSCD includes a great many measures of socio-economic outcomes relevant to the missions of social citizenship. These outcomes include familiar measures such as income and wealth inequality, unemployment and (at-risk-of) poverty, both for entire polities and broken down for particular sub-populations (e.g. income position of long-term unemployed migrants). Furthermore, the outcomes part also includes an array of more issue-specific conditions involving gender and ethnic equity, quality-of-life conditions, non-standard contracts, working-hour patterns, and broader happiness and health indicators.

Thirdly, CSCD includes a battery of macro-level measures focused on power resources, broken down as much as possible to give attention to the three realms of resources central to the EUSOCIALCIT resource-based framework: normative resources, instrumental resources, and enforcement resources. The measures turn out to be harder to measure in many respects or, in any event, to have received much less systematic empirical attention in the past. As a result, these measures are fewer and farther in existing empirical social science and policy analysis on which we draw for CSCD. That said, the dataset includes a substantial and growing complement of such macro-level measures, focusing on (1) mandated policy benefits that promise generosity of social policy protections, normative beliefs/stances in polities and legal edicts in law (for normative resources); (2) conditions that are offering bases for effective information-gathering, monitoring, and political mobilization and

influence (central to instrumental resources); and (3) conditions of legal enforcement, inspections, sanctioning patterns and capacities (all relevant to enforcement resources).

Finally, CSCD includes a number of variables that are more background conditions relevant to the empirical study of the origins and implications of social citizenship in Europe. Hence, there are plenty of measures of regime characteristics and institutional background variables: political institutions, quality of government, the partisan composition of government cabinets, socio-economic background variables (growth, demographics) and so on. In any event, it is important to recognize the fluidity of categorizations for particular measures. There are a number of socio-political conditions, for instance, that might be closely and intuitively related to social-rights outputs but also as social-rights resources, such as labour market regulations or some generosity-based measures of social policy, which may also constitute unique resources for social action.

The most innovative aspect of this database, we should stress, is that it merges existing datasets in a selective manner, providing the data needed to analyse the development of social citizenship in Europe in an accessible format and across a more extended time period. We hope to use the CSCD data for all EUSOCIALCIT missions and inform broader and subsequent studies by policymakers and scholars interested in social citizenship. This is, of course, far from the only resource, as many of our research interests require focusing on other levels of analysis – e.g. individual-level developments that require individual-level survey cross-section time-series data and/or panel data – and more qualitative exploration. However, macro-level data is central to providing an empirical “bird’s eye perspective” on the board development trends of social citizenship rights in Europe and beyond, contributing significantly to the conceptualization of and conversation about social citizenship.

In the remaining sections of this paper, we illustrate the relevance of the CSCD information to analyse European social citizenship. We do so by focusing on a series of empirical snapshots of how the database measures the character, development and associations between social-rights-related outputs, outcomes and resources. That focus will follow two steps.

In the first step (Section 4), we present a general, encompassing overview of social-rights outputs, allowing us to make judgements of the extent of social-policy outputs encompassing of the most salient features of social rights – education provisions, family assistance, employment assistance, old-age assistance, healthcare and disability, housing, etc. With respect to such broad aggregates, we explore trends over recent decades (since the mid-1980s), through to the most recent several years after the global financial crisis (though, understandably, before the onset of Covid-19). We also identify variation between EU Member States and regional clusters of member states. This reveals significant developments and differences in the degree of welfare state provision, and by implication, social rights in Europe. We can also use this encompassing analysis to gauge the extent of convergence among EU Member States, important to the development of equitable and common European social standards. And, finally, we can also judge whether shifts are taking place in the priority given to particular kinds of social provisions – for instance, more or less on health than employment, but also more or less focused on social policy transfers or protection, as opposed to more in-kind services or ‘social investment.’

In the second step (Section 5), we focus more specifically on how social-rights outputs are associated with downstream outcomes and with upstream resources. We also explore such associations by focusing in more detail on three major areas of social-rights provision: education, employment, and family policies. We could, of course, focus on other policy areas with CSCD. However, these example areas are of particular relevance for the future of European social citizenship as we see it, and they are directly related and connected to the topical foci of the other work packages in the EUSOCIALCIT project. In our focus on these areas, we shall identify trends and cross-national developments in policy outputs in these respective domains. Still, we shall also illustrate associations with causally upstream resources and downstream outcomes. Hence, we can give a sense of how the same selected policy outputs are associated with and might have implications for outcomes of interest – including socio-economic outcomes like poverty and inequality and outcomes more specific to the policy realm or social right on which the policy output focuses. Furthermore, we can give a sense of how selected measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement-based resources are associated with, and perhaps capture influence upon, selected policy outputs in education, employment and family policy. And finally, we illustrate how such examples of resources might also alter how outputs influence or are associated with outcomes.

For such an illustration, our coverage is by practical necessity very partial. We focus here on a range of snapshots about outputs more than on resources or outcomes, partly because of the more extensive data availability of the former but also because a focus on outputs gives a clearer sense of trends in policy development not just relevant to but also proxying for many crucial aspects of social rights. Within our focus on outputs, we zoom in on spending-based rather than other measures of welfare effort or explicit take-up or policy participation, primarily because with available data, spending-based measures give the most encompassing (in terms of various social rights) and most up-to-date overview possible. While our dataset (and analyses) aims to cover all indicators for the same time intervals (years) and the same countries, data availability sometimes requires focusing on smaller sub-samples of countries and periods. However, even within these limits, the illustrative focus on selected measures and features gives plenty of important insight into the developing state of social rights in Europe. Hereby, it gives a flavour of CSCD's relevance and power to inform a more thoroughgoing analysis of such rights.

4. Measuring social citizenship I: General trends in European social citizenship

Our illustration begins with the dominant trends and trajectories in the development of the most salient social-rights outputs covered by our data: social policy spending and orientation in all EU member states as well as OECD states more broadly since the early 1980s. We focus first on overall trends in social expenditure – to judge whether these key indicators or social-rights outputs are trending towards more or less spending and more or less generous provision – perhaps for some countries and regions more than others. We then focus on whether there are indications of a convergence of social policy trends within the European Union, which in turn could signal the advent of a genuinely European dimension of social citizenship. Thirdly and finally, we consider developments in the orientation of European social expenditures as social-rights outputs – towards priorities on one aspect of social rights more than another (e.g. old-age assistance versus health versus education, etc.) and priorities on social transfers or protection (e.g. cash assistance) as opposed to social investment provisions (e.g. in-kind services and activation).

Before we proceed to this illustration, we want to clarify some issues on social expenditure data on which all three of our illustrative steps focus (for both trends, convergence and orientation of social-rights outputs). A first issue relates to the relationship between spending data and welfare state generosity. While comparative welfare state research frequently focuses on the level and change of social spending, often measured as the percentage of GDP, such a focus has been rightly criticised (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Clasen and Siegel, 2007) for missing the policy generosity available to individuals and about which political mobilization often takes place. CSCD includes such policy-design or ‘generosity-focused’ measures, such as a focus on replacement rates or composites of the welfare state design (see, e.g. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) focus on de-commodification and Scruggs (2006)’s Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database, CWED). However, we deliberately conceptualize such programmatic generosity measures as *normative resources* rather than *outputs*. We expect that a given level of generosity, as a normative resource, can be expected to foster the actual implementation of more or less generous benefits, yielding more or less generous-in-implementation policy provisions, measured as take up or policy spending of benefits. Another downside of generosity measures, however classified, is that they have much more limited coverage in terms of policy realm, countries and years. For instance, as they are focused on the generosity of social transfer programmes, they fail to capture development trends in social services and social investment policies. Furthermore, levels of spending on social issues matter most fundamentally as indicators of policy outputs: they reflect levels of actual participation or take-up of a policy benefit and also the financial footprint of social policy outputs. Such footprints are very important to gauge, given our focus not only on how resources can influence outputs but also on how outputs can matter to outcomes (potentially moderated by resources). Table A3 in the Appendix illustrates the correlations between various spending measures of outputs and also generosity measures of normative resources based on selected examples.

The second issue is about the distinction between public and private spending. The expenditure data in the CSCD covers public spending and – where available – private social spending, which is particularly relevant in the cases of health care, education, and partly pensions. To consider private

programmes as parts of social rights outputs, they need to have both a social intent and they must include a redistribution feature. Such programmes can be mandatory or voluntary (Natali et al., 2018). Mandatory private benefits are often incapacity related. In several countries, for example, employers are obliged to provide sickness benefits. Mandatory private insurances can also cover occupational injuries and accidents. Several EU member states have additional employment-based pension plans that come with mandatory contributions based on funding systems. Voluntary private social security programmes include, for example, private pension plans and private social health insurance.

As a third issue, we point to the role of ‘hidden’ spending on the welfare state. As pointed out by Adema (2001), many welfare states (some more than others) make extensive use of the tax system for social policy purposes. There are countries, where cash benefits are taxable as a rule, and there are countries, where they are not. The net social effort is lower than indicated by gross spending indicators in the former countries. Another issue that may be hidden is the indirect taxation of consumption by the recipients of benefits. Because when the indirect taxes are higher, the effective purchasing power that the recipients of benefits have is lower. Furthermore, tax deductions, for example, through family tax allowances, are sometimes put in place of direct expenditures. This means the tax system can be used for social policy purposes too. To consider these different effects of the tax system, the literature distinguishes between gross and net social spending. In contrast, the latter is the spending level after discounting the distributive effects of the tax system. If and where available, we include measures of net social spending as well.

Fourth, analyses of changes in social spending over time need to be aware of the fact that social spending also changes due to changing socio-economic and demographic conditions that are largely independent of political decisions. This means, changes in expenditure ratios may not be caused by policy changes. Such changes may be caused by the number of beneficiaries, for example, due to changes in unemployment levels or an ageing population related to cyclical elements. Therefore, it is essential to control for cyclical and demographic factors when assessing the impact of policy decisions on the further development of social citizenship. In the remainder of this deliverable, we focus on descriptive analyses of trends, but more sophisticated, regression-based analyses will be implemented at a later stage of the project.

Finally, we want to point out our ‘pragmatic’ approach in classifying countries in the analyses. Even though we are, of course, aware of the fact that the membership composition of the EU has changed and expanded (with the sole exception of the UK leaving the EU in 2020) since the mid-1980s, we compute regional averages for different country clusters in the EU based on geographical and cultural proximity of these countries, essentially keeping membership in different regional clusters constant across time and independent of the fact when exactly countries formally joined the EU. In other words, our averages (both overall and region-specific) are computed based on EU membership between the years 2004 and 2020. This approach implicitly adopts a somewhat broader perspective of what ‘European’ social citizenship is about, going beyond but still centring on EU membership.

4.1 Overall social expenditure trends

To start, Figure 2 displays changes in the overall level of public social spending, averaged across EU countries and expressed as the percentage of GDP. The Figure includes public expenditure as it is

commonly defined – covering public cash and services spending on old-age, health, family, unemployment, housing and miscellaneous other assistance. It also includes the more refined measure of net total social spending, which takes into account the taxation of social benefits and transfers as well as tax expenditures as explained above. Following a spike in spending in the early 1990s – likely a side effect of the severe economic recession in many European countries in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall – social spending (both gross and net spending) has remained relatively stable up until the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis after 2007. Not surprisingly, average levels of spending moved up significantly in the wake of the crisis, both due to a shrinking (or less increasing) GDP as well as higher levels of total social spending. In recent years, spending levels have declined again. However, they are still significantly above the pre-crisis levels, and of course, due to the Corona pandemic, they are very likely to increase again in future years.




Figure 2. Average social expenditure in the EU (%GDP), 1985-2018

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

Figure 3 (see next page) disaggregates average spending levels to show the varying trends in spending across five EU regions which also happen to be ‘worlds of welfare-labour markets’: North, East, South, West and Anglo. For our purposes, “North” refers to the three Nordic EU members: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. “East” refers to Central and Eastern European member-states: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. “South” refers to Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal and Greece. “West” refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and “Anglo” refers to Ireland and the United Kingdom. As said above, the region values are calculated through the mean of all country-values in the specific region. As demonstrated in Table 1 in the Appendix, EU memberships across regions have changed since 1985. To briefly reiterate, rather than (re-)calculating averages for the different European regions depending on changing membership, we see the EU as an alterable entity that is defined by geographical proximity and culture (Castles, 1993). Furthermore, we treat the United Kingdom as a full member of

the EU for this study (which was until February 1, 2020) since our study's time period ends before the full implementation of Brexit.

This figure reveals several important developments. First, as is well-known, there are significant and persistent differences in spending levels between regions, related to distinct welfare state models being established in the different regions that exhibit a high degree of path dependence in their development trajectories (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2011). For instance, the relatively modest spending position of the Anglo countries relative to the rest persists and has deepened, particularly in post-crisis years. An important exception is the Southern EU member states in more recent years.

Second, indeed, the Figure also reveals significant changes over time. Before the start of the crisis in 2007, Southern European countries, in particular, have undergone a process of “catching up” with their Northern European neighbours. At the same time, spending levels in the Nordic countries have decreased over a more extended period of time, suggesting a certain degree of convergence between these different regions. In contrast, spending levels in Eastern European and Anglo-Saxon countries have remained on lower levels throughout this period.



Figure 3. Average public expenditure in EU regions (%GDP), 1985-2018.

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

Third, the financial crisis has – as was already apparent in Figure 2 and now also clear from Figure 3 – led to an increase in spending levels across all countries, triggering a convergence process on this issue in the short term. However, in the wake of the crisis, we see diverging rather than converging patterns. Continental and Southern European countries continue to be relatively close to each other, while the Nordics have been moving to a higher level of spending again, though not too far away from the other regions. By contrast, spending levels in Eastern European and Anglo-Saxon countries have decreased again, moving these countries further away from the others but closer to each other. These simple stylized facts could indicate quite different responses to the economic and social policy fallout of the crisis.

Crucial to understanding the aggregate trends in the social-rights outputs of EU member states also recognize developments across the different categories of social expenditures. Figure 4 below depicts such spending trends averaged across EU countries for our period of observation. It confirms the well-known pattern that old-age pensions and health care claim, by far, the largest share of welfare-state budgets. Furthermore, in the wake of the 2007/2008 crisis and likely further driven by the pressures of demographic changes, average levels of spending on old-age pensions have increased significantly in recent years, even more so than health care spending (recall, again, that the measurement here ends pre-Covid). By contrast, public spending on education – a category of social-rights output not so far included in the aggregations in Figures 2 and 3 – has declined enormously in the recent time period. This latter trend may reflect the possibility that investment-oriented social policy types are more vulnerable to cutbacks in hard times of fiscal austerity compared to social protection or consumption-oriented spending (Breunig and Busemeyer, 2012; Streeck and Mertens, 2011). Such a pattern, in turn, likely reflects the different and complex political constituencies, with more consumption-based aspects of social-rights outputs being better protected by the interests of influential welfare state clienteles. Nevertheless, spending on family policies has incrementally increased as well over these years. We return to such trends across kinds or orientations of social-rights outputs in subsequent sections. Nevertheless, the clear pattern emerging from our CSCD-based summary is that familiar distinctions across the categories of spending have been reasonably stable for EU member states and robust even or because of the stresses of the global financial crisis.




Figure 4. Average public social expenditure across policy areas (%GDP), 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008

4.2 Convergence and divergences in European social expenditure trends

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, besides providing a general overview of time trends and cross-national differences in social citizenship, an important goal of this deliverable is to assess whether there has been some degree of convergence to levels of policy outputs within the EU, or to put it another way, to a common welfare state model. We would interpret evidence for a convergence of welfare states within the EU as an early indication of the emergence of a genuinely European social policy dimension.

One way to gauge the extent of such convergence is to employ so-called β -convergence tests. β -convergence implies that convergence appears when units of observation (countries) with a lower starting value in a particular indicator experience above-average growth in this indicator in the following time period. Traditionally used in scholarship on economic convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995), this kind of convergence indicates a ‘catch-up’ process where poorer countries experience higher levels of economic growth in the subsequent period, whereas richer countries grow slower over time, contributing to a catching up of poorer regions to the richer regions. This idea can also be applied to the growth of welfare states, i.e. if residual welfare states with low spending levels experience higher levels of spending increases in a later period. Graphically, this process of catching up can easily be spotted when putting past levels of a particular indicator on the x-axis and the increase in that indicator for the subsequent time period on the y axis (see below). Convergence (“catching up”) occurs if we can observe a strong negative association between these two variables (Holzinger et al., 2007).

To assess the extent of convergence more systematically, Figure 5 displays the relationship between public social expenditure as the percentage of the GDP in 1985 (i.e. the starting point of our analysis) and the change in public social expenditure as the percentage of the GDP between 1985 and 2016. This technique helps identify β -convergence, which occurs when country cases displayed a low value on a particular indicator (in our case: social spending) in the past display above-average positive changes in this indicator over time. And indeed, Figure 5 (see next page) reveals a strong negative and statistically significant association between past levels of spending and subsequent changes. For instance, Portugal only spent about 10 percent of its GDP on social policy in 1985 but increased spending well above average (14 percentage points) until 2016. Vice versa, spending levels remained virtually the same in the case of Sweden that had been the highest spending country in 1985. The Netherlands, also a high-spending country in the 1980s, even decreased spending levels. Overall, this is strong evidence of a “catch-up” process with countries in the upper left (mainly the Southern European countries, but also Denmark and Finland) catching up to spending levels of countries on the right (Continental European countries and Nordic big spenders).




Figure 5. Relationship between public social expenditure (%GDP) (1985) and the change in public social expenditure (%GDP) in the EU (1985-2016)

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

Figure 6 (see next page) takes another look at the potential convergence of spending levels. It displays the yearly mean absolute deviation of countries from the cross-country mean in spending levels (as the percentage of GDP).¹ Here, the statistic captures relative convergence (or divergence) when noticing a drop (or rise) in the value of such average absolute deviation from the mean (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002). First, looking at developments in EU member states, the Figure clarifies what we found above. After the mid-1990s surrounding moves to EU membership and diverging responses to the economic downturns (particularly in central and Eastern European countries) following the end of the Cold War, we see a secular trend towards convergence compared. Nevertheless, the pattern is quite volatile. The most significant drop in the mid-1990s follows a high degree of divergence in the early 1990s. The second-most dramatic period of convergence (drop in mean absolute deviation from the mean) occurred in the years immediately following the 2007/2008 crisis, which is likely due to the pre-crisis convergence identified above and the largely parallel responses of EU countries in the immediate post-crisis years. After that, likely in the context of post-crisis macroeconomic differences, we again see indications of divergence.

¹ This is related to standard deviation, or σ -convergence, i.e. the convergence of units of observation to a common mean. A characteristic of the standard deviation is that its value rises in line with the average value of the corresponding data set. To account for this, adjustments like the mean deviation from the mean are important. Just as the coefficients of variation, which is defined as the standard deviation divided by the value of the mean of the data set that it is applied to. The term relative convergence (divergence) can be used when noticing a drop (or rise) in the value of the coefficient of variation and the term absolute convergence (or divergence) can be used when using the standard deviation as a criterion (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002).

Putting these trends into perspective, Figure 6 also displays a trend curve for the entire OECD. The two curves follow a similar over-time trend, which essentially shows that a convergence of social spending levels has happened within the EU and across the broader set of OECD countries. The Figure shows that there are lower levels of convergence among the wider OECD world (i.e. higher levels of dispersion) than within the EU throughout the period under review, leading credence to research that has shown that European economic integration is associated with an even higher pressure on welfare states to delimit spending increases compared to globalization broadly defined (Beckfield, 2009; Busemeyer and Tober, 2015). In any case, the future of European social citizenship depends on convergence not turning into a “race to the bottom” but rather a process of mutual learning and adjustment, which may eventually contribute to the emergence of a genuinely European model of the welfare state.




Figure 6. Convergence of public social expenditure (%GDP) across all EU and across all OECD countries (1985-2018)

Note: Divergence versus *Convergence* is measured in the average deviation from the mean (lower values mean more convergence).

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

We can also assess the degree of β -convergence of public social expenditure across different policy areas. This is done in Figure 7 (see next page), where we focus again on the mean absolute deviation from the sample mean of EU countries in a given year (similar to Figure 6, but for different policy areas).² With higher values signaling more divergence, we can see that the two largest categories of spending – old-age and health spending – exhibit a significant degree of divergence, particularly since the global financial crisis. Most other lines measuring dispersion have been stable, hence not showing

² This can also be done by regressing the annual growth of gross public social expenditure as percentage of GDP on the initial level of social spending as percentage of the GDP. The results of such an investigation, which are presented in the Appendix (Table A2). Overall, the results indicate more convergence for EU than non-EU countries. For the EU, the policy areas incapacity related, education, family, ALMP, and unemployment show statistically significant β -convergence.

any significant trends towards divergence or convergence. However, in detail, one can see some modest trends of convergence for ALMP and unemployment spending as well as spending on disability pensions and families. This could be explained by variances across the EU in socio-demographic changes. In particular, some EU countries have increasingly elderly citizens and longer life expectancies than others.




Figure 7. Convergence of public social expenditure across different policy areas (%GDP) in all EU countries (1987-2014)

Note: Convergence is measured in the average deviation from the mean.

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

4.3 Social right orientations in European social expenditure trends

Next, we explore a few of the major developments in social policy orientations in social-rights outputs. Of course, there are many ways of how one could distinguish welfare-state or social-rights orientations or approaches. And indeed, our summary of different categories of spending already capture important differences between countries in, say, the predominance of old-age and health spending compared to unemployment or job-training (ALMP) aspects of social-rights outputs. Our focus here, however, will be on two distinctions or oppositions. The first concerns public versus private social expenditure to gauge the mix between market-based and more government-based forms of social-rights outputs. A second concerns protection-focused cash transfers versus more social-investment-focused in-kind services and activation. We consider trends in both of these sets of mixes or trade-offs, in turn.

4.3.1 Public versus private social expenditures

First, consider the relationship between public and private social expenditure and how it has changed over time. Broadly speaking, over the past decade, private alternatives to the public welfare state services and benefits have increased in almost all EU member states (Gingrich, 2011). Such privatization happened, for instance, by expanding the role of capital-funded pension schemes (Naczyk and Palier, 2014), by expanding private independent schools, even in social-democratic countries (Klitgaard, 2007), or by offering choice and competition in the provision of social services, including health care (Gingrich, 2011). Recent research by Bussemeyer and Iversen (2020) on this issue finds that the increasing availability of private alternatives to public provision and financing may, in the long term, undermine public support for the public pillars of the welfare state.

Figure 8 displays trends in private social spending across the different regions of the EU as defined above. Overall, private social spending levels are low compared to public social spending (in the single-digit % of GDP compared to 20-plus % of GDP for public social expenditures, as tracked above). Such levels of private spending in EU countries are also lower than the private spending in North American and Eastern Asian countries (often well above 10% of GDP). Still, Figure 8 shows that spending levels are quite substantial at least in some countries, with Anglo-Saxon countries on top and Southern and Eastern European countries at the bottom of the ranking. This is clearly related to differences in welfare state regimes: liberal welfare states are particularly likely to exhibit higher levels of private spending because market mechanisms are more common in delivering and funding social policies. The Figure also shows a general upward trend in private social spending across the years, albeit with persistent and significant cross-country differences.




Figure 8. Average private social expenditure across EU regions (%GDP), 1985-2019

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

Further analysis of such trends, however, suggest that however much private expenditure may have increased absolutely, they have become a bigger share of total social policy effort only in some countries, effectively increasing the divergence between countries in that regard. Figure 9 considers the average trend for policy spending on public relative to private expenditures – showing the EU-wide mean and per-region trend of taking each country’s yearly spending on public social expenditures minus its private social expenditures (both as % GDP). Here we can see that the division of labor between public and private funding sources has remained relatively stable across the EU since 1985, with a slight uptick towards public provision after the crisis. In Southern Europe, we see a continuous increase in the public share in spending throughout the entire period. Vice versa, the private share of spending has significantly increased in Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly in the post-crisis years. Thus, it is mainly in the post-crisis period that we see indications of divergence on this indicator.




Figure 9. Public versus private social spending in the EU, 1985-2015

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

What this all means for orientations in social-rights outputs remains an open empirical question. Literature has emphasised that welfare states in advanced democracies have a high degree of institutional stability and are thus resilient to change. For example, according to Pierson (1994, 2001), social policies and welfare institutions create strong “lock-in” effects once they are established. This is because welfare recipient groups have material incentives to maintain (or expand) existing social policies. Still, the growing evidence of increasing class divisions over the level and structure of social spending might challenge the institutional stability of welfare states. Busemeyer and Iversen (2020) argue that the increasing class divisions are closely related to the development of private alternatives to public welfare provision. In line with this, Korpi and Palme (1998) argued that spending targeted to the poor, while progressive, meets with opposition in the middle and upper-middle classes. In contrast, an “encompassing” welfare state model would unite the interests of both low-income and high-income citizens. This is because such a model combines basic security for everybody with an earnings-related component, which would lead to higher levels of overall redistribution. Busemeyer and Iversen (2020) show that the availability of private alternatives reverses this logic as private alternatives undermine support for universalistic public social insurance programmes among the

middle and upper-income classes. This is important as the political support of these groups is important for the future of the welfare states and particularly their political viability. Hence, these results (and our findings from above) could point to a critical vulnerability of the universalistic welfare state model. Such insights are neglected, or at least underestimated, in Brooks and Manza (2006, 2007), Esping-Andersen (1990), and Pierson (1994), Korpi and Palme (1998) and many others.

4.3.2 Public social expenditures across social investments and social transfers

A second important issue of orientation in social-rights outputs concerns the distinction between transfers and services, related to cash and in-kind provisions, and more generally to social protection as distinct from “social investment.” These isomorphisms are at the centre of a long-standing debate about which social policy trajectories are most humanizing, enabling, and macro-economically sustainable. The social investment approach has gained considerable traction in the EU political debates over the European welfare state's future. And since the late 1980s, most European governments have enacted a range of social reforms to make their social policy systems more efficient, family-, intergenerational- and employment-friendly over the life-course (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Hemerijck, 2013, 2017; Hemerijck et al., 2016; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011). Next to retrenchments, there have been deliberate efforts to recalibrate social policy programmes and institutions to adapt these policies to the economic and social context of the knowledge-based economy. For instance, changes include increasing investment in early childhood education and family services can be more or less consciously used to promote gender equality or at least labor market participation for parents, particularly women, trends associated with a still very incomplete gender revolution in social policy (Esping-Andersen, 2009). Another, perhaps more sweeping example is the combination of such early childhood and family services with worker retraining and “activation” measures that aim at reintegrating the (long-term) unemployed into the labour market. Criticisms of such changes associated with the social-investment approach have worried that they might hollow out social welfare provisions for the poorest and most vulnerable citizens and also potentially undermine the redistributive functions of welfare states, in particular, if social investment policies were to replace rather than complement existing social policies (which most supporters of social investment would object to, actually). As a matter of understanding orientations of social-rights outputs, hence, it is worth briefly tracking possible social protection versus social investment skews in social policy expenditures.

In the literature, we can find ongoing debates about the definition of social investments and social transfers (see e.g. Cantillon, 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Plavgo and Hemerijck, 2020). In our analyses, we consider the programmatic and sub-programmatic categories of social policy effort that inform this distinction – such as looking at unemployment insurance spending compared to active labour market programme (ALMP) spending. In line with Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011), however, we also can more generally operationalise social investments as in-kind-services and social transfers as cash-benefits. When it comes to data on general public social expenditure, no such variables are readily available. Hence, for operationalising the overall public expenditure social investments in percentage of the GDP, we created the social investment variable as follows:

Social expenditure in services, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) = Total social expenditure, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) - social expenditure in cash, % of GDP (public/mandatory private)

For operationalising public expenditure social investments in percentage of the GDP across different policy areas, we used the public expenditure in percentage of the GDP of all the different policies in a certain policy area that add up to the total public expenditure in percentage of the GDP of that policy area. Here, we evaluated whether a policy is either an in-kind-service or a cash-benefit and calculated the social investment variable as follows:

Mean social investments across family policy, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) = [social expenditure in early childhood education and care, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) + social expenditure in-home help and accommodation, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) + social expenditure in other in-kind-services, % of GDP (public/mandatory private)] / 3

Mean social transfers across family policy, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) = [social expenditure in family allowances, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) + social expenditure in maternity and parental leave, % of GDP (public/mandatory private) + social expenditure in other cash-benefits, % of GDP (public/mandatory private)] / 3

Figure 10 considers this and another way of capturing such skews. The upper-left schedules summarize the total spending on cash-transfers compared to total spending on in-kind services. Here we see that the respective trends quite closely appear to track one-another. However, throughout our analysis period, we also see a clear tendency of transfers to be much more substantial than in-kind services, at least in terms of economic footprint (% GDP).




Figure 10. Trends in Social Transfers/Protection vs Social Services/Investment in the EU, 1985-2015
 Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, SIWE Database 2017. Dotted line indicates beginning of crisis in 2007/2008.

The upper-right schedules provide a different approach to measuring social protection versus social investment, drawing on the operationalization by Ronchi (2018). This focuses on spending categories of social expenditures that are most focused on social-investment targets – like old-age or health transfers as “social protection” compared to early-childhood education and training, and active labour market spending and other lines as “social investment.” Furthermore, the measures focus on “budgetary welfare effort” that normalizes these social protection measures and social investment by their target population rather than the percentage of the GDP. Taking standardized scores for these respective measures, we see here a clear trend in increasing social protection and social investment, but since the global financial crisis, a flattening of social investment. In contrast, social protection measures have declined considerably. Taken together, this would indicate a shift in the dominant orientation of European welfare states towards the social investment model in the post-crisis years.

The lower-left panel in Figure 10c, finally, more directly tracks the relative orientation on transfers/protection versus services/social-investment. It shows the mean difference between in-kind/services and cash/transfers (the darker line) and between social investment and social protection (the lighter line). These are shown on different scales to clarify the respective trends that they capture. The basic point is that we see a secular trend in the European Union member-states towards skewing social-rights outputs in the direction of services/social-investment.

Figure 11 considers whether such tendencies are different across the EU member states, a definite likelihood given the regional skew of social investment reforms in European policy discussions. The Figure captures the regional breakdown, focusing on in-kind/services social expenditure (in the left-hand panel (a)) and cash/transfers (in the right-hand panel (b)). These are side-by-side on the same scale to facilitate the comparison. Again, we see that the transfers tend to be larger than the services in all the regions, but the regional differences and trends matter. For instance, we see that in the Northern EU member-states spending on in-kind services is almost as substantial as spending on transfers. In contrast, Southern and Eastern European countries spend the least on services throughout the entire period. The figure also shows that both the North and the West have been shifting quite substantially in their orientation towards in-kind services (rising spending) relative to cash-transfers (stable spending levels).




Figure 11. Aggregated public social expenditure as social investment (%GDP) and as cash-transfers (%GDP) across EU regions, 1985-2019

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

Finally, Figure 12 considers whether such patterns constitute meaningful convergence or divergence in the social-investment-versus-social-protection orientation of social-rights output. Again, we do so by sticking with the two simple operationalizations of the orientations – following Figure 10 – but here focusing on the mean absolute difference from the mean in those spending orientations. Additionally, consistent with the per-region breakdown in Figure 11, we can see in Figure 12 that both cash-transfer programmes and spending on in-kind services have seen significant divergence, particularly since the global financial crisis. Measured according to the Ronchi (2018) operationalization, however, we see convergence with respect to social protection, but a quite sudden divergence with regard to social investment over that same post-crisis period. Our interpretation of these various patterns is that there have been quite substantial increases in spending on social investment programmes and a sharpening skew in orientation towards such programmes in some regions. Overall, it is clear that different measurement and conceptual approaches speak with different voices and point in different directions. Furthermore, continued use of the CSCD should help more fully compare and make fuller sense of such patterns.




Figure 12. Divergence of public social expenditure across social transfers and social investments (% GDP) in all EU countries (1985-2018)

Note: Convergence-divergence is measured in the average absolute deviation from the mean.

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, SIWE Data Base 2017.

5. Measuring social citizenship II: Relationships between outputs, outcomes and resources

Our illustration of our CSCD and its application to understanding our resource-based conception of social rights has so far focused only on major descriptive developments concerning social-rights *outputs*. In this section, we focus in greater detail on relationships between social-rights outputs, outcomes, and resources. We illustrate first how our spending-based social-rights output measures may have important implications for social-rights outcomes of general interest (poverty, inequality). We also illustrate how outputs might be affected by and have implications moderated by power resources in the development of social rights. Particularly, outputs may reflect, or be consequences, of an array of *normative, instrumental or enforcement resources*. Equally, outputs can have implications for outcomes that are moderated by the same resources. For our illustrations, we focus on examples of resources (e.g. collective bargaining institutions and quality-of-democracy access to information, both measures of instrumental resources) that are plausibly relevant to a broad array of social-rights outputs. By considering how policy-specific outputs might have implications for selected outcomes, we focus by way of illustration on generic examples of the risk of poverty and income inequality. Likewise, in considering how policy-specific outputs might be functions of power resources, we consider generally applicable examples of normative resources (e.g. policy-generosity measures) and instrumental resources (e.g. collective bargaining coverage, democratic access to information).

5.1 Outputs influencing outcomes

In focusing still on the aggregated policy level, we first illustrated how outputs might be analysed as shaping outcomes. To illustrate how the CSCD can be used to explore possible links, causal or correlational, between social-rights outputs on the one hand and relevant outcomes on the other, we can look at two generally relevant measures of economic suffering (wellbeing): poverty and income inequality. The poverty measure on which we focus is the Eurostat’s measure of “risk of poverty”: the percentage of the population who are either severely materially deprived, or living in households with very low work intensity, or ‘have an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers)’ (Eurostat database, 2020). The inequality measure is a Gini index for disposable, post-tax and post-transfer income (net Gini) (OECD database, 2020). Both of these measures of non-wellbeing are generally applicable, in principle, to most or even all of our social-rights outputs, including our most aggregate measures of social-rights outputs, such as aggregated public social expenditures. To explore how social-rights provision might yield benefits to a polity, hence, one can consider whether our general measure of social-rights output – aggregate public social expenditures (% GDP) – correlates negatively with these measures of social-rights outcomes. Of course, this kind of broad, aggregate-level analysis has limitations regarding the mechanisms by which social policy output broadly defined actually translates into and shapes socio-economic output. However, it is useful nevertheless to get the big picture.

Figure 13 (a-b) provide summaries of these bivariate associations. In both cases (and all examples in this Section 5), we consider the bivariate relationships for the full country-year sample in our CSCD database (the light-coloured observations in the scatterplot, and the regression line with 95-percent

confidence intervals, and with the R-square reported). However, we also show the most recent observation for the EU member states given (observations marked with country abbreviations). Of course, these are mere snapshots, not full specifications to address the many threats to the inference that such associations capture any causal connections. Regardless, they illustrate the associations relevant to our research agenda using CSCD to explore resource-based social rights.

The Figure shows some noteworthy variation with the two measures of non-wellbeing descriptively. Generally, the risk of poverty is highest in South and East EU countries, higher in Anglo EU countries, and the lowest in West and Nordic EU countries. Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the risk of poverty has not changed much in South, East, and Anglo-Saxon EU countries. In West and North EU countries, however, the risk has increased. Nonetheless, with respect to income inequality, the pattern is broadly similar, with the Anglo-Saxon economies and the Baltic republics having the highest inequality, followed by the Southern European countries.

What is immediately apparent and important is that aggregate social expenditures are negatively associated – as expected – with both of these measures of suffering or “un-wellbeing” as social-rights outcomes. Equally impressive and perhaps surprising, we see that the association between poverty and social expenditures is not statistically significant or substantively large (judging by the slope of the regression line). Again, such relationships are of very preliminary inferential value. This is important in and of itself, suggesting at this broad descriptive-statistic illustration that aggregated social expenditures are more effective in combating inequality than poverty.




Figure 13. Social-rights outcomes (poverty and inequality) as functions of aggregated social expenditures (1985-2018)

Data: OECD Inequality Data Base; Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty database.

5.2 Resources Influencing Outputs

Second, we consider illustrations of how outputs might reflect resources. The CSCD includes plenty of general measures of power resources, including examples in all three sub-categories of normative resources, instrumental resources and enforcement resources. We can illustrate first the most obvious example of resources shaping outputs – how key generosity measures of policy provisions (as key *normative resources*) might be associated with, or underlie, spending-based measures of outputs. Figure 14 summarizes the relationship such a measure normative resources (generosity social policy

benefits) and spending-based policy outputs. There is a positive relationship between the Combined Generosity Index from Scruggs (2006)'s Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database and the total public social expenditure.





Figure 14. Aggregated Social Expenditures (1985-2018) as a function of Welfare-state generosity (Combined CWED index for unemployment, pension, sickness programmes)

Data: OECD Labor Data Base; SGI Quality of Democracy Data.

Beyond this obvious of example of (normative) resources, other aspects and measures of resources can be expected to matter to shaping outputs. Figure 15 (a-b) illustrates how the same most aggregated measure of social-rights output – aggregated public social expenditures – might also be associated with, and perhaps a function of, other key and familiar measures of power resources. To further illustrate our resource-based approach, we can consider two familiar and straightforward measures of instrumental resources: in the left-hand panel, collective bargaining coverage (the percentage of employees covered by collective agreements) (Visser, 2020); and with the right-hand panel, the access to information in democratic institutions (media freedom, media pluralism, access to government information), a key aspect of democracy giving citizens information about their social rights. Both of these “instrumental” resources highlighted, here, can again be expected to be of general application to most any measure of social-rights outputs, hence also including our most aggregated measure.



(a) Effects of Collective-bargaining rights

(b) Effects of Information Access

Figure 15. Aggregated public social investments (%GDP) in EU countries (1985-2018) as function of social-rights resources (collective bargaining rights and democratic access to information)

Data: OECD Labor Data Base; SGI Quality of Democracy Data.

Consistent with our intuition, both instrumental-resource measures correlate positively (and statistically significant) with aggregated public social expenditures. The relationship is considerably tighter with respect to collective wage-bargaining rights, perhaps unsurprising since social welfare provisions are more closely connected to industrial relations resources of social actors than to broader informational resources in democratic institutions. Nonetheless, the examples suggest how our CSCD measures provide some leverage to explore our resource-based conception of social rights in Europe – and how general measures might, in fact, correlate in expected directions with our most aggregated measures of social-rights outputs.

5.3 Resources moderating influence of outputs

Third, Figure 16 (see next page) provides a simple illustration of how resources might also be important for social citizenship by moderating the associations between outputs and outcomes. The Figure provides detail into the relationship between total public social expenditure and poverty that we explored in Figure 13a, showing a very weak (and insignificant) negative relationship that portrays social expenditures doing little to fight poverty. Here we again summarize the relationships between the same two variables, but now consider how the relationships might differ between settings with half of the full sample with low power resources and the other half of the sample with high power resources. Figure 16 splits the full sample based on one of the examples of such power resources discussed in Figure 15 above: information access. The left-hand panel of Figure 16 shows the relationship between social expenditures and poverty in country-years where information access is *lower* than the median of the full sample. In comparison, the right-hand panel focuses on country-years where information access is *higher* than the full-sample median.

As is evident by such splitting of the sample, the generally weak bivariate relationship we saw between social expenditure outputs and poverty outcomes may have something to do with such outputs and outcomes having different relationships depending on information-access resources. In the settings with lower than the median of such resources (the left-hand panel), we see that total public social expenditures tend to have a positive relationship with poverty – suggesting that expenditures might exacerbate poverty rates. This is because low access to information is likely to go along with inequalities in access that exclude the (resource) poor. As a consequence, social spending trends to privilege higher income classes in these settings. In contrast, settings with higher than median information access (the right-hand panel) are places where social expenditures tend to have a significantly *negative* relationship with poverty – descriptively supporting the intuitive inference that total social expenditures lower poverty rates. This splitting of the samples is purely suggestive. However, a more systematic analysis that considers the statistical interaction between expenditures and information access in the full sample tells the same story. To be sure, we are looking here at just one measure of general social-rights outputs (total expenditure) that appears to have implications for one measure of general social-rights outcomes (poverty) that are moderated by one measure of resources (information access). Nevertheless, the illustration should suggest how our CSCD data harbors information to consider many other ways that social citizenship may be tied up with power resources.




Figure 16. The Relationship between total public expenditure (%GDP) and poverty, moderated by access to information

Data: OECD Labor Data Base; SGI Quality of Democracy Data.

6. Measuring social citizenship III: A focus on education, employment and family policies

Our illustration of our CSCD and its application to understanding our resource-based conception of social rights has so far focused only on major developments and interconnections concerning social-rights *outputs, outcomes and resources* at a very aggregated level of policies. Yet, the story within particular realms of social rights is also important to explore for EUSOCIALCIT. And our resource-based framework expects – perhaps mainly – that interconnections between resources, outputs and outcomes are likely more fine-grained or issue-specific – something smoothed over by the aggregate story. It might well be, for instance, that the fragile negative association/relationship between poverty and aggregated social expenditures reflects some aspects of social expenditures being irrelevant to general poverty. For this reason, our resource-based conception of social rights requires more fine-grained exploration. And our CSCD-based data seeks to gather more fine-grained data suited to such exploration.

In the following three sub-sections, therefore, we focus on three specific policy areas in terms not only of the general measures of outcomes and resources explored in Section 5 but also selected outcomes and resources more suited to these respective policy realms. The three policy areas were touched upon briefly above: education, employment and family. These policy areas are essential for the welfare state's social investment aspect and touch on important outcomes and resources – both general ones and a few specific features of socio-economic life. We, therefore, devote somewhat more detailed attention to these three policy realms, in turn.

6.1 Education policies: Trends and associations with outcomes and outputs

We begin with the policy realm of education, a major realm of social rights and less studied as part of welfare state research. As our exploration in Section 3 above demonstrated, substantial convergence characterises education spending in the past 30 years across the EU. This is slightly more pronounced in the EU compared to non-EU countries. In this section, we further examine education policy outputs as spending across EU member states from 1985 to the present and then explore education policy's relationships to both social-rights outcomes and resources.

6.1.1 Detailed trends in education spending

Since we already observed that the average public education spending is moving downwards in the last section, Figure 17 shows how this trend varies across EU regions. The short answer is: “not much”, as we can see similar trends across EU regions in the aggregated public education expenditure. These amount to relatively stable levels of spending until the beginning of the financial crisis 2007/2008, a slight increase during the crisis, followed by a sharp decrease in the years afterwards until the present. These trends are most pronounced in the Anglo EU countries, which had among the highest education

expenses in 1985 and among the lowest in 2016. Given the popularity of the social investment paradigm more generally and education spending more specifically (Garrizmann et al., 2018; Busemeyer et al., 2020), this declining trend in spending levels may seem surprising. It may be explained by changing demographic and socio-economic background conditions, declining political support for educational expansion among government parties as other, more pressing issues have moved onto the political agenda and/or increasingly severe fiscal constraints due to austerity pressures.




Figure 17. Average public education expenditure across regions (%GDP), 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

To further understand the trends in education policies in the EU, we examine public education expenditure across three sectors: 1) pre-primary, 2) primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary, and 3) tertiary education. Complementing the previous figure, Figure 18 (see next page) displays changes in the relative share of public spending in different education sectors (as a share of total spending in that particular sector). This figure shows that the significant decline in overall public education spending in recent years has been accompanied by a shift in funding resources from public to private as the share of private funding in higher education increased significantly. This is related to significant changes in higher education financing in some countries, particularly the increasing reliance on private spending contributions in terms of tuition fees (Garrizmann, 2016). Increasing private spending on higher education, in turn, has been found to be associated with significantly higher levels of socio-economic inequality (Busemeyer, 2015).




Figure 18. Relative proportions of public expenditure across different education sectors (%GDP), 1985-2019

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008

Next, in order to dive into more regional-specific trends in public spending on specific education areas, Figure 19 examines region-specific trends in public spending on tertiary education. Broadly speaking, the trends are quite similar to overall trends in education spending seen in Figure 17 above. Hence, whereas spending levels of pre-primary, primary and secondary education are more stable, overall changes in education spending levels are largely driven by volatile spending on tertiary education. Against the background of public debates about the need to expand higher education to meet the challenges of the knowledge economy as well as lingering concerns about persistent levels of youth unemployment, particularly in Southern Europe, the decreasing spending trends in recent years are surprising (and from a policy-maker's perspective, worrying).




Figure 19. Average public tertiary education expenditure across regions (%GDP), 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

6.1.2 Education spending and social rights outcomes and resources

Education-related Outputs Influencing Outcomes. We now analyse the association between public spending on tertiary education and socio-economic outcomes. First, we examine its relationship to the same two general indicators of social-rights outcomes as discussed above: poverty and inequality, measured precisely as in section 5.1. The results for both relationships are in Figure 20 (a and b). The left-hand panel shows how public spending on tertiary reduction correlates in bivariate terms negative and statistically significantly with EU poverty risk measure (percentage of individuals earning less than 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income, after social transfers). The right-hand panel suggests a roughly similar negative relationship with net Gini income inequality. Both relationships are somewhat stronger than in the case of social expenditures explored in section 5.1. These patterns corroborate previous research that public educational investments effectively mitigate inequality (Busemeyer, 2015; Huber and Stephens, 2014). These findings also speak in favour of those arguing that expanding the social investment pillar can contribute to mitigating inequalities (Plavgo and Hemerijck, 2020), even though such social-rights outputs are often seen as privileging affluent middle classes at the expense of more vulnerable groups (Cantillon, 2011; Bonoli et al., 2017).




Figure 20. Relationship between public expenditure on tertiary education and risk of poverty and social exclusion, 2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Database, Eurostat.

We can also illustrate how tertiary-education spending, as a specific sub-category of education-related social-rights outputs, might have plausible implications for more directed social-rights outcomes. An obvious place to focus on the outcome ledger are measures of take-up or participation in a service program associated with the social-rights output. In this case, a good such measure is students in public tertiary programmes as percentage of all tertiary-enrolled students. One would expect that more generously funded public tertiary spending tend to be associated with both more demand and supply of programmes that channel student university-level learning into public programmes. As shown in Figure 21, the association here is indeed positive and statistically significant for the full sample. However, it is also clear that the enrollment data is very dispersed with some significant outliers, like Belgium and Estonia, which combine average levels of public spending with below-average levels of enrolment of students in public programmes. The implication is that in contexts with high spending levels relative to enrolment rates, spending levels per student are more generous.





Figure 21. Relationship between public expenditure on public tertiary education enrolment, 2016
 Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, Eurostat.

Resources Influencing Education-related Outputs. The second set of associations for tertiary education spending concerns how such social-rights outputs might actually be shaped or be a function of relevant power resources. We begin with the generally applicable social-rights resources on which we have been focusing – collective bargaining rights and democratic information access – that plausibly can influence not just general social-rights outcomes like total social expenditures but also specific tertiary-education spending. The results, shown in Figure 22 below, are positive for both measures: almost non-existent for collective bargaining rights (see left-hand panel) and quite strongly and significantly positive for information access (see the right-hand panel of Figure 22). This is an intuitive enough pattern, for what it is worth, since collective bargaining can be expected to be less tightly focused on empowering those focused on tertiary education – and instead focused on lending resources to social actors and citizens more interested in the direct concerns of workers in the labour market. Also, given the well-known institutional complementarities between collective wage bargaining and vocational training, a well-entrenched wage bargaining system is associated with higher levels of spending on vocational education and training (Busemeyer and Iversen, 2012), delimiting the fiscal leeway for investments in higher education.



(a) Effects of Collective-bargaining rights

(b) Effects of Information Access

Figure 22. Public expenditure, tertiary education and associations with general social right resources
 Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, Quality of Government.

Beyond how tertiary spending might be functions of such general instrumental resources, however, we can also illustrate the ostensible role of a clear example of normative resources from our CSCD dataset: a measure of public support for the normative and descriptive idea that one’s country offers a “fair chance for everyone to achieve the level of education they seek,” drawn originally from the European Social Survey which we aggregated for each country (and understandably available for fewer years than many of our other social-rights output, outcome and resource measures). Figure 23 shows a positive relationship between public tertiary education expenditure and this measure of norms of fairness of broad education access. In other words, in settings where citizens are more likely to perceive and prefer a greater openness of access to education – a social-rights resource – are also settings where polities spend more on tertiary education, an education-related social-rights output.




Figure 23. Relationship between public expenditure on tertiary education and a fair chance to education, 2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey.

Resources Moderating the Influence of Education-related Outputs on Outcomes. Third and finally, we illustrate how power resources may not only have implications for the extent of education-related social-rights outputs but also potentially alter the effects of such outputs for outcomes. To take but one example, we consider whether the general relationship between tertiary education spending and income inequality – captured in Figure 24 below – might shroud distinct relationships in sub-samples characterized by low versus high power resources of import. Furthermore, to take one example of such resource-based moderation, we again look at the same relationships we saw in the full sample in Figure 24, but here splitting that sample in two: with the left-hand sample being those country-years where collective bargaining rights are below the full-sample median, and the right-hand sample being country-years where such rights are *above* the median. Here we see that this particular general measure of instrumental resources does not do much to moderate the general negative association between tertiary spending and inequality. That association is more statistically-significantly negative for the high-rights settings (right-hand panel) than for the low-rights settings (the left-hand panel). However, the difference is relatively modest – suggesting in this illustration that such rights do not significantly alter the general pattern of tertiary education tending to be associated with lower income inequality.




Figure 24. Relationship between public expenditure on tertiary education and Income Inequality, Moderated by Collective Bargaining Rights

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey.

6.2 Employment policies: trends and associations with outcomes and outputs

We now turn to a second illustrative exploration of more detailed social-rights outputs, outcomes and resources, this time in the realm of employment policies. Employment policies take a central place in debates about the future of European social citizenship as they are crucial in countering trends towards labour market dualization, rising levels of in-work poverty and inequality related to changing gender relationships. The convergence analysis in section 4.2 revealed roughly parallel trends for two key aspects of employment policy in the past 30 years across the EU: stable levels and modest recent convergence of trends for spending on active labour market policies (ALMP) and unemployment insurance. Here, we take a more detailed look at distinct, and for some scholars competing, aspects of employment-policy outputs and their relation to important social-rights outcomes and resources.

6.2.1 Detailed trends in employment spending

Figure 24 presents, first, the regional breakdown of these ALMP and Unemployment Insurance (UI) trends, shown next to one another on the same scale to clarify their relative development. With respect to ALMP (the left-hand panel), the Figure demonstrates that the overall trends mask significant variation in trends across regions. Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries exhibit the highest levels of public ALMP spending from 1985 to 2016, but also a significant decrease in spending levels from a high in the early 1990s to a low in the years preceding the financial crisis of 2007/2008. In the other regions, the average public ALMP spending levels remained relatively stable between 1985 and 2016, with a small increase after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. It is only in the Anglo-Saxon EU countries where we can observe an overall decrease – while these countries had the second-highest level of spending in 1985, they are, together with the Eastern EU countries, the lowest spenders in the present. The general pattern is different for UI (the right-hand panel), particularly in the sense that

several regions, not just the Anglo-Saxon polities, have implemented quite marked reductions in UI spending, particularly since the global financial crisis. Here it is the North that has shown the exception and marked increase in UI, comparable to its increasing ALMP over the recent period – though still (also exceptionally compared to other regions) spending less on UI than on programmes of social-rights outputs categorized as ALMP.




Figure 24. Average public ALMP expenditure and UI across regions (%GDP), 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008

Further zooming in on developments in employment-policies as social-investment outputs, we can also explore different categories of programmatic spending within ALMP. Figure 26 shows this breakdown, focusing on provisions that might be less familiar to scholars and policymakers than the broad category “active” labour market policy. As it clarifies, there are considerable differences in trends and scale of provisions under the “active” moniker. The trends worth noting between the ALMP sub-components are simple. However, we see the relatively large emphasis on job training and retraining within ALMP effort, though we also see that this predominance declined since recent, converging upon spending on job-search administration and employer incentives for employment to workers.





Figure 25. ALMP expenditure by sub-programme (%GDP), 1985-2015

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

A final descriptive pattern in the detail of employment policy worth considering by illustration of CSCD data is the balance of provisions associated with social investment compared with more social protection/transfers within the employment policy realm. In the discussion in Section 4 above, we have already addressed such issues in a very aggregated manner. But we can also do so for the more targeted, employment-policy realm of social-rights outputs. The notion of social investment focused on employment policy has gained considerable traction in the political debates over the future of the European welfare state. Since the late 1980s, a majority of EU governments accomplished a bundle of employment-policy reforms in order to make their social policy systems more effective and employment-friendly (Hemerijck, 2013). The fundamental changes have been increasing the flexibility of employment relations through a range of employment arrangements and measures that aim at activating (long-term) unemployed to get back to work, including part-time work, temp-agency work and self-employment. Thus, the social investment pillar of employment policy expanded considerably from the 1990s onwards (Bonoli, 2013). This expansion included, amongst others, social security activation, spending on active labour market policies, as well as training and education to boost employability. Concerning labour market regulation, flexible labour markets received greater support from several EU member states. These labour markets include improved components for labour market outsiders and are governed by more flexible employment relationships (Schmid, 2008).

To track the social investment versus more social-protection/transfer orientations in employment policy, we can refer back to the rough comparisons we have seen above between ALMP and UI. However, one must focus more specifically on the elements underlying these paired spending realms and also on employment-related spending outside these realms to construct more targeted measures. Figure 27 (see next page) provides such a more focused comparison. The left-hand panel focuses on the trend in the EU average for spending on detailed social-investment-related features of ALMP, just summarized in Figure 26, compared to spending on the key social-protection or social-transfer orientation in employment policy (by combining UI with early-retirement spending). The result shows that the more passive, transfer oriented aspects of employment policy are consistently larger in their fiscal footprint than the ALMP counterparts and that the trends tend to track one another. There is no clear catch-up or convergence pattern, though both have seen modestly secular increases since the global financial crisis. Within the social-transfer-related realm, it is worth noting that most of this involves unemployment compensation rather than the much smaller and dropping retirement compensations. In comparison, the trends in social unemployment transfers are supported by similar trends across various programmes, such as training, employment incentives, or direct job creation.

Figure 27's right-hand panel, in turn, uses the SIWE data from 2017 (Ronchi, 2018) and focuses on clusters of employment policy spending categorized as either social protection or social investment, based on employment related "budgetary welfare effort" and (as discussed in Section 4) normalized by target recipient population. Here we see a broadly similar picture to the left-hand panel's portrait of relatively greater emphasis or orientation towards social protection. However, with the budgetary welfare effort measures, we see that the gap between the different types of spending is narrowing, mainly because social protection effort is dropping faster than spending on social investment employment policy. This is in line with the imperative of social investment taken forward by international organisations, such as the European Commission (2013) and the OECD (2017), particularly as the prerequisite for strategies of 'inclusive growth' in the aftermath of the Great Recession.



(a) UI/early-retirement vs. Soc.Inv.-related ALMP (b) Soc.-Invest. vs. Soc.Prot. worker policies

Figure 27. EU average investment and transfers spending social in employment policies, 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base; Ronchi 2018

6.2.2 The relationship between ALMP-related social rights outputs, outcomes and resources

With the diversity of employment policies in mind, we next address how these various orientations and sub-components of employment-policy outputs play out for actual outcomes of interest and how they might reflect or intertwine with resources. For now, we continue with our simple illustrations, here focused on how ALMP spending generally might have consequences for important social-rights outcomes and might also be partly shaped by social-rights resources. In doing so, we can draw on extensive literature, also discussed in Section 2 above, exploring empirical implications and origins of ALMP, often using more micro-level data and more targeted research designs (e.g. Hemerijck et al., 2016; Heckman, 1992). Our hope here is to illustrate how our CSCD data can build on such work and how it can do so within our resource-based framework for exploring ALMP as part of social citizenship.

Employment-related Outputs Influencing Outcomes. Figure 28 kicks off this illustration by considering ALMP-spending's association and plausible implications for our now-familiar general examples of social-rights outcomes: poverty risk (in the left-hand panel) and income inequality (in the right-hand panel). Consistent with plenty of other studies (see discussion in Section 2 above), Figure 28's simple bivariate associations in our country-year data within the OECD and Europe particularly reveal a beneficent pattern – where settings and periods with more generous ALMP effort tend to be associated with less inequality and poverty than in settings and times with less generous ALMP. However, it is essential to note that ALMP's basic empirical association is more strongly negative for poverty than is general social expenditure's and roughly comparable to the measured "effect" of tertiary education spending summarized above. And with respect to our net-Gini inequality measure, the negative association between ALMP spending on inequality is even stronger than in the cases of either general social expenditures or tertiary spending. Such comparisons are possible since the samples are identical in country-years and since we are talking about the same outcome variables of interest.³ Of course, more in-depth econometric analysis is necessary to make such comparisons more

³ The full sample variation in ALMP is associated with a decline in net-Gini from .345 to .2, compared to the full sample variation of tertiary spending associated with a drop from .35 to .26 (and for total social expenditures from .34 to .275).

careful and meaningful. Nevertheless, even such simple snapshots suggest significant social-investment payoffs of ALMP spending.




Figure 29. Possible effects of ALMP spending on Poverty and Inequality

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, Quality of Government Data.

To illustrate how ALMP as a particular social-rights output should also be explored for its associations with more issue-specific outcomes of interest, Figure 29 illustrates ALMP’s association with employment rates. The latter speaks to ALMP’s core mission as an ostensibly pro-employment policy. All intentions aside, the relationship in Figure 29’s uncontrolled and bivariate country-year setting is statistically-significantly positive but not particularly strong (with a meagre R-square of 0.05). This is prima facie disappointing news for the hoped-for efficacy of this kind of intervention and a signal of the importance to continue looking into this relationship in more detail with CSCD and other data.





Figure 29. Possible effects of ALMP spending on Employment rates

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base; OECD Labor Force statistics.

Resources Influencing Employment-related Outputs. Turning to ALMP’s possible connections to power resources, we begin again with associations with our two now-familiar general examples of instrumental resources: collective wage-bargaining rights and access to information. Both of these

generic power resources can be expected to be relevant to the political mobilization, preference-awakening and -aggregation of workers and citizens to want and politically push for employment policies to help improve working conditions and address economic insecurities – including ALMP provisions, among many other employment-related social-rights outputs. The literature on the implications of major industrial relations institutions influencing ALMP provisions is quite developed (Kim and Margalit, 2017; Garrett, 1995). The possible link to general information provision and transparency is less obvious. Still, it is relevant to the studies that actual provision of training and active employment provisions – even more than for passive unemployment assistance – often require more difficult-to-find and complex information about training trajectories, labour markets, and one’s personality fit with occupational options. Furthermore, broad institutional protections on the transparency of government form can be expected to proxy for a general high-information set of instrumental resources.

In any event, Figure 30 captures the positive and statistically-significant bivariate association between ALMP and both of these basic power resources. With respect to collective bargaining rights, the links are comparable to those for tertiary education and general social expenditures. For information access, the links with ALMP are somewhat more modest than we saw for either total social expenditure or tertiary education. Regardless, we have another simple illustration of how these general instrumental resources might indeed be necessary for the development of social-rights outputs, including ALMP provisions.



(a) Effects of Collective-bargaining rights

(b) Effects of Information Access

Figure 30. ALMP spending as a function of collective bargaining rights and information access

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

We can also illustrate, in Figure 31, more issue-specific resources that can be expected to inform and shape the political development and mobilization surrounding ALMP in particular. We draw on examples of a normative resource and on an opinion-based instrumental resource – both particularly relevant to ALMP issues. The left-hand panel of Figure 30 shows an example of a potentially relevant normative resource to ALMP development: the CWED index level of policy generosity with respect to unemployment assistance. And the right-hand panel shows an issue-specific example of an instrumental resource involving public opinion beliefs in the fairness of job access: the share of

respondents believing in a “fair chance for everyone to get the job they seek” in one’s country, drawn from recent public opinion waves of the European Social Survey that we aggregate (with sample and design weighting) for each European country (and all EU member states). As we saw earlier with survey-based aggregation, the drawback of such a measure is that this reliance on multi-country survey data means very little or no longitudinal dimension in the data. Nonetheless, the attitudes capture a normative resource of relevance to ALMP.

The results of such illustration are mixed. On the one hand, we see that the issue-specific CWED generosity-based measure of normative resources clearly has a positive association with unemployment-related social expenditures – stronger, in fact, than the more aggregated relationship discussed in Section 5 above. On the other hand, the right-hand panel shows that the bivariate relationship with actual ALMP is essentially a wash. Of course, this is a particular time point and aggregation to the polity-wide level, with all the methodological perils that doing so entails. The hint provided by the non-association is that this particular resource likely does not do much work in the politics of ALMP as a social-right output.




Figure 31. Relationship between public expenditure on UI/ALMP and CWED generosity of assistance and a fair chance to get a job, 2016.

Data: CWED; OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey (Scale: 0 “Does not apply at all” to 10 “Applies completely”).

The EPSR created the European Labour Authority. That latter body’s role is to coordinate labour inspection across the EU, for instance to locate exploitative and mislabeled work categories like bogus self-employed. Thus far, the European Labour Authority has little real regulatory authority beyond such information-gathering. Consequently, even if the EU has an ‘enforcement’ agency created, due to the recognition of problems of dualization/precarization, it is not likely to have a large impact unless more regulatory power and resources are devoted to it. This leaves lower-level national or subnational or sector-specific organizations as most relevant to current enforcement capacities.

Whatever the superintending, or mandating, regulatory body, the CSCD includes data capturing substantial variation over time and country in such enforcement capacities. Figure 32 illustrates an example of issue-specific enforcement resources relevant to ALMP: Labour conditions inspectors per 1000 workers, gleaned from the workplace surveys and reviews compiled by the International Labour

Organization (ILO). This measure is available for multiple recent years, between 2010 and 2019, in our CSCD database. It is relevant to ALMP as a particular employment-related social-right output because labour inspectors are sources of information and feedback to employers, employer associations, regulators and political actors (party representatives and local and national government representatives). As such, they can be expected to inform and inspire worker and citizen mobilization to do something through policy should there be shortcomings in the regulation of working lives. And, ALMP provision can be expected to be relevant to the latter, of course. Descriptively it shows volatility over time and regions/countries, with no uniform or overshadowing trend towards more or less, or convergence among countries, in such labour-inspectors' presence.

In any event, Figure 32 summarizes the modest positive association between ALMP spending and the density of labour inspection. This is a hitherto underexplored area of industrial relations and policymaking, so we have little to say about whether such a pattern captures something that more extensive research may have identified. But that is, of course, the hope of the CSCD and this summary of our resource-based framework for exploring social citizenship. In that spirit, this provides a plausibility probe supporting the hypothesis that, at least within the employment policy realm, an intrinsically meaningful measure of an enforcement resource might have significant positive implications for developing a related social-right output.




Figure 32. Relationship between public expenditure on ALMP and a fair chance to get a job, 2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey, 2018.

Resources Moderating the Influence of Employment-related Outputs on Outcomes. Finally, Figure 33 illustrates how such employment-related resources might moderate the relationships between ALMP and employment-related outcomes – focusing here on the example of the rate of labour inspections as the relevant resource and employment rates as the relevant outcome. This focus breaks down, hence, the general relationship between ALMP and employment rates summarized in Figure 29 by low versus high enforcement resources. Here we see a bivariate-descriptive pattern where labour inspections as a resource appear to play a meaningful moderating role and belie expectation. At both low and high levels of labour inspections to enforce national labour laws and monitor conditions, we

do see that ALMP tends to be associated with higher employment rates. However, at low levels of inspections, the relationship is *more* significantly and substantively positive than at high levels of inspections. Hence, such a pattern suggests that such inspections do not help translate ALMP outputs to employment-rate outcomes. Of course, this is one example that requires more in-depth scrutiny, but it is an example reminding us of the limits of enforcement resources in social citizenship.




Figure 33: Relationship between public expenditure on ALMP and employment rates, by low and high rate of labour inspectors per 10,000 persons

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, International Labour Organization.

6.3 Family policies: Trends and associations with outcomes and outputs

We conclude our illustration of detailed social-rights outputs and their connections to outcomes and resources by focusing on key trends and associations involving family policy. Here we want to again clarify the regional differences in spending commitments in this broad realm and then consider the distinction between social-investment-related aspects of family policy on the one hand and more social-transfer or social-protection oriented aspects on the other. We then focus on the cornerstone of social-investment oriented family policy: early-childhood education and care. In that context, we can consider how this key and growing feature of social-investment outputs relate to general and more issue-specific outcomes and resources.

6.3.1 Trends in family policies

Section 4 revealed that trends in average family spending are relatively stable across time within the EU and exhibited substantial convergence in family spending in the past 30 years between EU member states that are more pronounced than those of non-EU countries. To build on that portrait, we should look into trends in family policy generally and across its key sub-components. First, Figure 34 breaks down variances in total expenditures on family policy across different EU regions. It captures an inter-regional convergence in such trends, despite the divergent moment immediately after the post-financial crisis. It also shows the relatively high spending by the EU North and low spending of the EU

South on such family policies compared to their other regional counterparts, the convergence notwithstanding. Moreover, a quite striking feature of these trends is the recent post-crisis dive in family-spending outputs by the Anglo countries (a pattern applying to both the UK and Ireland).




Figure 34. Average public family expenditure across regions (%GDP), 1985-2015.

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.

Figure 35 (see next page) shows trends in family-policy expenditures, broken down by type of sub-policy. The most apparent and important patterns are two-fold. First, we see that the family cash-transfer category of spending has been the stable, dominant aspect of family policies in the EU. Second, we see that early childhood education and care (ECEC) has consistently been the second-largest expenditure sub-category, following a catch-up trend with family allowances/cash-transfers. The other aspects of family policy – including home-help/accommodation (distinct from general housing assistance), maternity/paternity leave payments (public reimbursements), and other in-kind benefit programmes – have been stable and more modest parts of family-policy social-rights outputs.

Let us think about these sub-categories in terms of cleavages or orientations in family policies. We can distinguish the sub-categories that are social-investment related to those that are more social-transfer or social-protection related. Social-investment related family programmes include maternity and parental leave, home help/accommodation and above all ECEC – all notable for their service-based contributions to labour market adjustments, facilitating a more gender-equitable combination of work and family. Social-transfer/protection-related family programmes, in contrast, include family allowances, a cash transfer, and other basic family benefits that are in-kind (e.g. assistance and mediation with family planning, parenting, relationships). Figure 36 (see next page, the left-hand panel) shows the trends in these two clusters of family policies. It shows an important development: Social-investment-related family-policy spending has risen more quickly in the last several decades than social-protection-related family policies. It has (just before the onset of the financial crisis) overtaken the latter. As we can surmise from Figure 35 above, this is largely the consequence of the substantial growth of ECEC programmes in the EU.




Figure 35. Family-policy expenditure by type of spending (%GDP), 1985-2015.

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008.




Figure 36. Average spending on SI and social transfers in family policies in the EU, 1985-2016

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dates of the financial crisis 2007-2008 shaded.

For the remainder of our section on family policies, we zoom in on ECEC programmes, the backbone of social-investment-related family policies. To clarify the trends in spending on this particular sub-category, consider our final trend diagram in Figure 37 (see next page), which tracks ECEC spending across EU regions since the 1980s. It shows that the EU North is particularly the outlier in its consistent priority given to spending on ECEC compared to the other EU regions. On the other hand, those other regions are engaged in the process of catching up with the North, at least in terms of resources devoted to ECEC programmes. That catch-up process took a significant leap in 1997-8 with EU and national political commitments to improving such provisions, but the trend has continued apace more modestly since then. Despite such convergence, the familiar pattern of difference is also betrayed by the ECEC trends, where the West closes-in most quickly on the North. At the same time, the South remains more modest than the rest in this orientation.




Figure 37. Average public early childhood and childcare expenditure across regions (%GDP), 1985-2015

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, dotted line indicates the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/2008

6.3.2 The relationship between ECEC and social investment outcomes and resources

Family-related Outputs Influencing Outcomes. Finally, we turn to the associations between Early childhood Education and Care (ECEC) as a social-rights output with key downstream outcomes and upstream resources. Once again, we begin with the outcomes and with the general outcomes that allow some comparison to the illustrated outcome-related effectiveness of other outputs. Figure 38 shows how ECEC in the full country-year sample correlates with our standard poverty and inequality measures. We can see that the relationships are again negative and statistically significant. These negative relationships can also be compared with those for other output measures above since the sample in country-years is the same and outcome metrics identical. Focusing on such comparison, ECEC's association with ostensibly downstream income inequality (the right-hand panel of Figure 38) is on the order of the inequality associations with total public social expenditures and with tertiary education, but less than inequality's strong negative association with ALMP spending's association: moving along the sample range of ECEC spending is predicted to be associated with a drop from .33 to .25 in net Gini scores. However, the left-hand panel of Figure 38 shows that ECEC's association with the risk of poverty is more substantially negative than any of our other illustrative associations between outputs above. Again, moving from the maximum to the minimum of ECEC spending is associated with a drop in risk of poverty percentages from 18.3 to 11. Such a pattern corroborates other studies suggesting the outsized effects of targeting assistance in helping families to combine work with childcare in a way that does wonders to the income positions of vulnerable families. Hence, the expansion of ECEC is a major policy tool to redress poverty – possibly as shown here in the short term, and not just in the long term (Pavgo and Hemerijck, 2020).




Figure 38. Possible effects of ALMP spending on Poverty and Inequality

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, Quality of Government Data.

ECEC can also be compared to a wide range of more issue-specific social-rights outcomes. These include the conditions of children, gender-specific or family-composition-specific employment, poverty, and other measures of objective or subjective socio-economic outcomes. For now, we focus on a quite crucial outcome related to gender equity in the EU: the UN Human Development Reports’ “Gender Inequality Index” (GII) (UN 2019). The GII’s encompassing metric of gender inequality is based on gender inequalities in three aspects of human development: (1) reproductive health, which captures the maternal mortality ratio and by adolescent birth rates; (2) empowerment, which captures the proportion of parliamentary seats that women hold and by the proportion of adults older than 24 with at least some secondary education; and (3) economic status, which captures labour force participation rate of the population aged 15 years and above.

Figure 39 (see next page) shows the association between ECEC spending and this measure of gender inequity. Here we see that ECEC is statistically-significantly negatively associated with this measure of gender inequality. This pattern holds for the full sample but also for any given year of the EU sub-sample. If we focus on the various subcomponents of this general metric, we get similar results. That the relationship is significantly negative is no great surprise, as settings, where social-rights outputs are arrayed to allow parents to combine work with family, are likely to be particularly beneficial to the work-, life- and health-chances of women.

Resources Influencing Family-based Outcomes. This opens us up to our final illustrative focus on possible power resources that might plausibly (among other things) help foster the development of ECEC provisions as social-rights outputs. Figure 40 shows how ECEC is associated with our illustration of general instrumental resources: collective wage bargaining rights (on the left-hand panel); and information access in democratic institutions (on the right-hand panel). We see a pattern again where both broadly relevant measures of power resources are positively and significantly associated with ECEC in bivariate descriptive snapshots. The positive association with collective wage bargaining rights is a plausible one, given how European unions and employers negotiate collective-bargaining agreements on a range of working conditions that include work-family provisions and benefits. This kind of bargaining often spills over into legislative initiatives for social policy innovation, and not just in settings where unions play formal roles in such policy setting. The positive association for information access is likely a more vague socio-political mechanism. The information clarifies conditions of gender equity, or social insecurities, that can put norms of family equity and policy shortcomings and qualities under higher scrutiny. Such a process can be expected to foster the development of ECEC no less than other provisions of social-rights outputs.






Figure 39. Relationship between ECEC and Gender Inequality Index

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, UN/World Bank.



(a) Effects of Collective-bargaining rights



(b) Effects of Information Access

Figure 40. ECEC spending as a function of Collective bargaining rights and information access

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base.

To illustrate also the possible associations between ECEC and more issue-specific resources, we close with a couple of crucial features of socio-political conditions that capture relevant normative and instrumental resources. First, we can examine the relationship between ECEC and the normative resources expressed in broad normative beliefs held by a country’s population, such as the judgment that “childcare for parents is a government responsibility,” taken from the European Social Survey that we aggregated for each country for CSCD. Figure 41 shows the bivariate relationship between ECEC and the very limited observations made possible by such ESS public opinion metrics. While the paucity of data makes finding any relationship a challenge, the lack of any correlational association – certainly not the clear-cut positive relationship one might expect – is still a surprising pattern to behold. Existing research on the dynamics of public opinion on childcare policy (Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021) suggests that this might be explained by the policy feedback effects of different existing childcare regimes on variegated patterns of public opinion. Another explanation might be that the attitudes pick up disappointment with a low-protection status quo ante. We take this as a mandate to further study normative resources relevant to ECEC in an individual-data context.




Figure 41. Relationship between public expenditure on early childhood education and childcare and childcare norm, 2015

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey.

Figure 42 (see next page) illustrates issue-specific resources relevant to ECEC. It focuses on an apparent political condition that can be seen as an instrumental resource open to individuals, social actors and others seeking to develop family-focused social rights: the share of women in lower or single legislative bodies (International Parliamentary Union, 2017). Such shares are a measure of descriptive representation of women in the political process and likely a proxy for female representation in other levels of political life. As such, we suspect that the measure captures the availability of political actors and institutions to take on demands and to translate these into policy legislation, regulation and implementation initiatives. While ECEC benefits all those attempting to combine work with family, the conditions are likely to be particularly meaningful to women. Hence, we can surmise, or hypothesize, that better political representation of women can provide legal, political, informational footholds – indeed, resources – for the development of ECEC provisions. Vice versa, the existence of well-developed policies that reconcile work and family life might be particularly helpful in promoting political engagement and mobilization among women. Such a conception of female political representation makes this variable some combination of an instrumental resource and an enforcement resource.

It should be little surprise, then, what we see with Figure 42 (see next page). We can see that the relationship is particularly strong in substantive and statistical-significance terms, at least as a bivariate relationship. Of course, it is also possible that the bivariate association is picking up the opposite direction of causation – where more ECEC helps give footholds to professional women that can in time open up more possibilities and spur qualified candidates for women in government and positions of political power. However, the resources-to-output direction of causation is more likely, if only because of the more modest time lag one can expect to hold with how political representation breeds policy compared to the longer time needed for the opposite direction. Hence, with CSCD aggregate data, we have some important descriptive-statistic evidence that the ECEC face of family policies is associated with issue-specific instrumental and enforcement, if not normative, resources.



Figure 42. Relationship between ECEC spending and Share of women in parliament

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey; International Parliamentary Union 2017.

Resources Moderating the Influence of Family-based Outputs on Outcomes. Our final illustration, summarized in Figure 43 (see next page), concerns how ECEC’s association with an ostensibly downstream measure of social-rights outcomes – in this case, female poverty rates – might be different depending on the level of instrumental resources captured by low versus high shares of women in parliament (the same resource illustration in Figure 42). While we already know from Figure 38a that ECEC is associated with lower poverty in general, we can see here that it is also associated with lower *female* poverty rates, though in a way that is substantially and significantly stronger in settings where there is a high share of women in parliament than in settings with low shares of women in parliament. Here, hence, we have an important and issue-specific measure of instrumental resources playing a strong and expected moderating role in how an essential measure of family-based outputs (ECEC spending) might “affect” an important issue-specific social-rights outcome (female poverty).




Figure 42. Relationship between ECEC spending and poverty, by Share of women in parliament

Data: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, European Social Survey; International Parliamentary Union 2017.

7. Conclusions and recommendations

Advancing social rights can help to address divergence in social trends across and within EU member states, as well as to reduce the risk of both economic and social shocks. Social rights are also an essential element for fully realising EU citizenship and attaining the EU's targets in defeating poverty and social exclusion (Wren, 2012; Hemerijck, 2013; Bourguignon, 2015; Mahutga, 2017; Diamond, 2019). Still, welfare states in Europe continue to provide different degrees of protection and possibilities for their citizens. Especially in times of crises, where incomes are declining, inequality and poverty are rising, and working arrangements become more precarious, welfare support is essential to secure economic and social stability (Eurofound, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). While we at this time of writing lack the data to shed light on developments beyond the impact of the financial crisis 2007/2008, we expect similar or even worse trends after the Covid-19 pandemic – an acid test for European social citizenship. Consequently, EU leaders should address issues close to the citizens, and continue to integrate the European Pillar of Social Rights in the new European coordination process, now centered on Next Generation EU and its implementation. Amidst the focus on climate change, mitigation and digitalisation, it is important that the social agenda should not be forgotten.

This study aimed to lay the empirical groundwork to investigate the state of affairs and future development perspectives of European social citizenship. More specifically, it addresses several questions related to the measurement of European social citizenship in social-policy related resources, spending-based outputs, and social-rights outcomes across EU member states from 1985 to the present. First, we asked how to measure “social citizenship” with macro-level data? How can we make use of available data, provided by agencies such as the OECD, Eurostat and others, to gauge broad development trends in the realisation of social-citizenship rights across the EU? For this particular study, we compiled the Comparative Social Citizenship Dataset, which allows comparisons between aspects of social-rights outputs and their ‘downstream’ outcomes and related ‘upstream’ resources.

Such comparisons support important conclusions for welfare states at both national and EU level. For example, while institutionalisation of the European Labour Authority was an important first step for combating precarization and dualization, that institution should have more regulatory and financial resources. Because socio-economic exploitation takes place throughout the EU realm, from the West to the East (EU-dualized), the combatting of precarisation and dualization should be addressed at the EU-level. Or, the EU work-life balance Directive could be a major milestone in gender equalisation, but it will depend on how it will be implemented in member states, especially the level of compensation for earmarked parental leave.

Second, we examined trends in European social citizenship between 1985 and the present, using the new CSCD data. These trends suggest significant convergence in policy outputs (public expenditure) across most policy areas in the EU, such as education, ALMP and family policies before the crisis of 2007/2008. This indicates the emergence of a European welfare state model in a very broad sense as collective commitment to devote a significant share of a nation's economic output to social policy and

welfare, thereby largely avoiding a race to the bottom in social rights. This is good news for the overall trends in European social citizenship, but the full realization of a European welfare state model – if desired – definitely requires additional efforts. The convergence trend was mostly observed for the pre-crisis years leading up to 2007/2008. And *divergence* in outputs, resources and, potentially in the long term, outcomes increased again after that crisis moment, even though European-level efforts to establish and expand the social pillar of European integration intensified significantly in the 2010s. This suggests that EU-level efforts to expand and further develop the social pillar of European integration must be coordinated and integrated with member states' efforts. Perhaps the current period of post-Covid-19 rethinking represents an historic opportunity to promote these efforts. On the other hand, the same pandemic-inspired rethinking may also create significant new obstacles to further progress in promoting the EPSR, as short-term pressures for compensation and then fiscal austerity may come to dominate any upward ratcheting and coordination of social-citizenship realization. Overall, in any event, our study supports the view that welfare remains a largely national issue.

Third, the contours of this European model of the welfare state increasingly resemble the social investment approach of the Nordic countries in some policy areas, such as education, employment and/or family policy. Our data show consistent and persistent cross-national differences between sub-sectors of the welfare state and no overwhelming support for convergence towards social investment. However, we do find certain trends from social transfers to social investments across our three focal policy areas (education, employment and family policy). It is likely no coincidence that for a number of years immediately preceding these trends, the European Union has also been active in promoting the Europeanization of education, focusing on higher education (the Bologna process) and vocational education and training (in the context of the Copenhagen process). For a long time, these processes have been rather disconnected from EU initiatives in the domains of employment and social policies. The Europe 2020 strategy – the successor to the Lisbon strategy – finally brought these two different policy areas closer together, reinforcing the goal of promoting what amounts to a social investment approach.

Fourth, we examined the relationship between social policy as social-rights outputs and selected measures of social-rights-related outcomes important to judging the payoffs and downsides of general and issue-specific social-rights outputs. This study demonstrates that social policy input can improve considerable inequality outcomes over time, for example, poverty risk, income inequality and gender inequality. The results also have shown illustrations of important issue-specific outcomes, such as employment as a modest function of ALMP and gender equality as a strong function of early childhood education and care (ECEC) provisions. More detailed and methodologically rigorous research is necessary here as our analyses remained on the level of macro-level associations and bivariate correlations.

Fifth, we have also examined relationships between social policy outputs on the one hand and causally upstream power resources that our resource-based framework hypothesizes to be central to social citizenship in Europe. We have found a wide array of how such resources matter, including a smattering of examples of instrumental, normative and enforcement resources as distinguished in our

EUSOCIALCIT research. Among these illustrated resources, some are generally applicable – such as collective bargaining coverage or information access in democratic institutions. Others have been more specific to the functions and missions of a particular social-rights policy output.

Along the way in the descriptive and analytical illustrations of this paper, we have asked about the impact of the crisis years (2008-2012) on the policy trajectory. We have seen, time and again, that the impact of the financial crisis 2007/2008 has been very pronounced, with public expenditure increasing right after the beginning of the crisis but then decreasing in the years after and until the present in most policy areas and policies that we examined. This also applied to convergence across the EU; in other words, the crisis years diminished some of the previous advances in the European model of the welfare state. This finding has important implications for the expected impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on European welfare states and EU governments.

Despite limitations to the present study, its analysis offers insights into the measurement of social citizenship in social policy outputs, resources and outcomes across EU member states from 1985 to the present. While we observed a significant increase and convergence of public social expenditure (also in different policy areas, including social investment policies), these were partly reversed with the financial crisis 2007/2008. We can expect such ‘setbacks’ to be even more pronounced due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Important to the study’s tracing of such patterns, however, is the pattern of associations between resources and social rights outputs and outcomes, suggesting that strengthening resources may be key to the future of European welfare states

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Appendix

Table A1. Overview of countries included in the CSCD

	Country	ISO	Start EU membership	Start OECD membership
1	Australia	AU	-	1971
2	Austria	AT	1995	1961
3	Belgium	BE	1958	1961
4	Bulgaria	BG	2007	-
5	Canada	CA	-	1961
6	Chile	CL	-	2010
7	Colombia	CO	-	2020
8	Croatia	HR	2013	-
9	Cyprus	CY	2004	-
10	Czech Republic	CZ	2004	1995
11	Denmark	DK	1973	1961
12	Estonia	EE	2004	2010
13	Finland	FI	1995	1969
14	France	FR	1958	1961
15	Germany	DE	1958	1961
16	Greece	GR	1981	1961
17	Hungary	HU	2004	1996
18	Iceland	IS	-	1961
19	Ireland	IE	1973	1961
20	Israel	IL	-	2010
21	Italy	IT	1958	1962

22	Japan	JP	-	1964
23	Korea	KR	-	1996
24	Latvia	LV	2004	2016
25	Lithuania	LT	2004	2018
26	Luxembourg	LU	1958	1961
27	Malta	MT	2004	-
28	Mexico	MX	-	1994
29	Netherlands	NL	1958	1961
30	New Zealand	NZ	-	1973
31	Norway	NO	-	1961
32	Poland	PL	2004	1996
33	Portugal	PT	1986	1961
34	Romania	RO	2007	-
35	Slovak Republic	SK	2004	2000
36	Slovenia	SI	2004	2010
37	Spain	ES	1986	-
38	Sweden	SE	1995	1961
39	Switzerland	CH	-	1961
40	Turkey	TR	-	1961
41	United Kingdom	GB	1973	1961
42	United States	US	-	1961

A more systematic exploration of convergence can be done by regressing the annual growth of gross public social expenditure as percentage of GDP on the initial level of social spending as percentage of GDP. The results, which are presented in Table A2, indicate a β convergence of 3.3 percent per year for the period 1985-2015 for all EU and OECD countries, and a β -convergence of 7.5 percent per year for EU countries only. This means that the difference of a country with respect to the average declines by 3.3 rep. 7.5 percent per year. Overall, the results indicate more convergence for EU than non-EU countries. For the EU, the policy areas incapacity related, education, family, ALMP, and unemployment show statistically significant β -convergence.

Table A2. Sigma convergence of public expenditure in the EU (%GDP), 1985-2015

		Intercept	β	Adj. R ²
Total	EU	20.122** (5.86)	-0.749* (0.28)	0.306
	all	10.892*** (2.49)	-0.334* (0.14)	0.178
Old age	EU	4.981† (2.5)	-0.305 (0.35)	-0.019
	all	3.901** (1.29)	-0.221 (0.21)	0.005
Survivors	EU	0.608 (0.43)	-0.474 (0.27)	0.132
	all	0.375 (0.24)	-0.365† (0.18)	0.113
Incapacity related	EU	0.699 (0.52)	-0.366† (0.17)	0.204
	all	0.644* (0.28)	-0.302* (0.11)	0.224
Health	EU	3.454 (1.98)	-0.417 (0.39)	0.007
	all	3.566* (1.29)	-0.489† (0.28)	0.082
Education	EU	1.946 (1.23)	-0.575* (0.23)	0.332
	all	1.927 (1.22)	-0.561* (0.22)	0.238
Family	EU	1.168** (0.31)	-0.299† (0.15)	0.177
	all	0.931*** (0.22)	-0.181 (0.12)	0.049
ALMP	EU	0.441** (0.13)	-0.656*** (0.15)	0.622
	all	0.270** (0.09)	-0.522*** (0.12)	0.488
Unemployment	EU	0.508 (0.29)	-0.538** (0.16)	0.434
	all	0.315 (0.19)	-0.489*** (0.12)	0.426
Housing	EU	0.146 (0.09)	-0.111 (0.19)	-0.053
	all	0.14† (0.07)	-0.139 (0.16)	-0.013
Other	EU	0.226 (0.15)	-0.107 (0.32)	-0.074
	all	0.245 (0.08)	-0.171** (0.12)	0.039

Data: OECD's Social Expenditure Data Base

OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10

A more systematic exploration of generosity-policy-design-based measures (measures of key social-rights *normative resources*) can be done by correlating different generosity indices with our key encompassing output measures: public expenditure in the EU. The results show that the Combined Generosity Index from Scruggs (2006)'s Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database, CWED (calculated as the sum of sub-indices for the generosity and coverage of benefits in the areas of unemployment, sickness and pensions) is significantly related to certain social expenditure measures, such as education, ALMP and unemployment. The Budgetary Welfare Effort Composite Index for Social Protection from Ronchi (2017)'s Social Investment Welfare Expenditure Data Set, SIWE


(calculated as the effort effectively put by governments on selected welfare programmes, net of the interferences due to economic and demographic oscillations) is only significantly related to social family expenditure. The Budgetary Welfare Effort Composite Index for Social Investment from the same data source is significantly related to certain social expenditure measures, such as total spending, family, ALMP and unemployment.

Table A3. Correlations between spending and generosity indicators


Public expenditure in the EU (%GDP)	Combined Generosity Index 2010	BWE Composite Index Social Protection 2014	BWE Composite Index Social Investment 2014
Total	.414	.362	.505*
Old age	.262	-.019	.091
Survivors	.176	.185	-.075
Incapacity related	.480*	.240	.723**
Health	-.294	.309	.287
Education	.517*	.019	.413
Family	.226	.505*	.648**
ALMP	.572**	.307	.736**
Unemployment	.447*	.237	.089
Housing	-.225	.330	.364
Other	.065	.329	.613**

Data: OECD's Social Expenditure Data Base, CWED, SIWE.


Additionally, we investigated the relationship between normative resources (generosity social policy benefits) and spending-based policy outputs in Figure A1. As can be expected, the results are positive for all four measures. First, as we already demonstrated Section 5 and in Table A3 above, there is a positive relationship between the Combined Generosity Index from Scruggs (2006)'s Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database and the total public social expenditure, which is also visualised in Figure A1 (see a). Second, we find that the Unemployment Assistance Generosity Index from Scruggs (2006) and public unemployment expenditure are positively associated (see b). Third, we also find a positive relationship between paid maternity and parental leave benefit weeks and public expenditure on maternity and parental leave (see c). Finally, the generosity of child benefit transfer and public spending on family allowances are also positively associated (see d). These patterns further emphasize the importance of generosity indicators and the need to further explore them and their relationship to outcomes in future research.




(a) General generosity and spending



(b) Unemployment generosity and spending



(c) Leave average and spending



(d) Child Benefit generosity and spending

Figure A1. Normative resources (Generosity social policy benefits) associated with Spending-based policy outputs.

Data: Policy outputs: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base, CWED

Paid Maternity and Parental leave benefit weeks: <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54760>

SPIN-CBD measure:

Nelson, K., Fredriksson, D., Korpi, T., Korpi, W., Palme, J. and O. Sjöberg. 2020. The Social Policy Indicators (SPIN) database. *International Journal of Social Welfare*. 29 (3). 285-289. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12418>